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ABSTRACT 
Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre-empt 
corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante 
mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent corporate misbehavior 
from occurring or quickly rectify transgressions. However, regulators are also self-interested and may be 
captured, uninformed, or ideological, and become less effective as a result. In this registered report, we 
develop a historical time series of corporate (accounting) scandals and (accounting) regulations for a 
panel of 26 countries from 1800 to 2015. An analysis of the lead-lag relations at both the global and 
individual country level yields the following insights: (i) Corporate scandals are an antecedent to 
regulation over long stretches of time, suggesting that regulators are typically less flexible and informed 
than firms. (ii) Regulation is positively related to the incidence of future scandals, suggesting that 
regulators are not fully effective, that explicit rules are required to identify scandalous corporate actions, 
or that new regulations have unintended consequences. (iii) There exist systematic differences in these 
lead-lag relations across countries and over time suggesting that the effectiveness of regulation is shaped 
by fundamental country characteristics like market development and legal tradition. 
JEL classification: F30, G18, G38, K22, L51, M48, N20 
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“Government regulators—you can count on it—are always late to presumed ‘problems’ 
that are invariably fixed by market competition. Once again, if regulators could predict 
markets, they surely wouldn’t be working as regulators.” Tamny [2015], p. 126 
1. Introduction 
Can regulators proactively pre-empt corporate wrongdoing before it occurs? And do they 
detect and rectify actual misbehavior in a timely and persistent manner? To shed light on the 
issue of “regulatory effectiveness,” we examine in this registered report the lead-lag relations 
between corporate (accounting) scandals and (accounting) regulation for a global sample of 26 
countries over a period of more than 200 years.1 This large historical panel lets us test whether 
corporate scandals are related to future regulatory actions, or whether the relation goes the other 
way, and past regulations systematically precede future corporate scandals. Such an analysis of 
temporal patterns allows us to draw partial inferences about the effectiveness of regulation, and 
how regulation has historically been shaped by corporate scandals (e.g., Nobes [1991]; Waymire 
and Basu [2007, 2011]). Given the high economic and social costs associated with corporate 
scandals, the importance of such considerations is clear. In monetary terms, the estimated annual 
cost of fraud among large U.S. corporations is US$ 380 billion or about 3 percent of the 
enterprise value of each firm (Dyck, Morse, and Zingales [2014]; see also Karpoff, Lee, and 
Martin [2008]). When the impact of lost public trust in financial markets is taken into 
consideration, the cost is even higher (Giannetti and Wang [2016]). 
The political economy literature puts forward three main perspectives to help interpret the 
observed temporal patterns between corporate scandals and regulation. First, the public interest 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 We focus on accounting regulation and accounting scandals involving private corporations, but do so in a broad 
sense. Thus, we also consider regulations and voluntary conventions regarding corporate governance and investor 
protection and, on the scandal side, incidents of financial frauds, embezzlements, investments schemes, tax evasion, 
etc. We do not include cases of political scandals and corruption or general financial crises. See section 2.1 for 
details. Henceforth, we interchangeably use the terms scandal, corporate scandal, and accounting scandal. 
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view argues that regulators are persons of character who seek public office to change policy and 
monitor market mechanisms in the best interest of the public (e.g., Pigou [1938]; Witman [1977]; 
Alesina [1988]; Previts and Merino [1998]; Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo [2005]; Callander 
[2008]). From this point of view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante mitigate 
agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent corporate misbehavior 
from occurring. Where corporate misbehavior is ongoing or has already occurred, effective 
regulators would detect and rectify transgressions in a timely manner, and prevent such incidents 
from recurring. According to this view, newly introduced regulation should reduce the incidence 
of future corporate scandals and, from an ex post perspective, current corporate scandals should 
increase the enactment of future regulations. At the same time, there might exist positive serial 
correlation between today’s regulations and future scandals in the short run, if it requires new 
rules for the regulator to become active and identify ongoing corporate actions as unlawful or in 
violation of public trust. 
Under the second view, legislators and regulators respond to economic incentives in their 
best self-interest (see e.g., Stigler [1971]; Krueger [1974]; Peltzman [1976]; Kalt and Zupan 
[1984]; Frye and Shleifer [1997]; Mahoney [2003]; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi [2010]; Tahoun and 
van Lent [2013]). They react to pressure from constituents, succumb to lobbying and other rent-
seeking behaviors, and act, in general, to increase their personal utility. If for these reasons 
regulators are captured by the regulated,2 their regulatory actions are unlikely to be effective in 
serving the public’s interest (e.g., Stigler [1971]; Partnoy [1999]; Mahoney [2001]; O’Connor 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"!Regulatory capture can occur through materialistic or non-materialistic means. The former is known as financial 
capture and indicates that the regulator receives bribes or political donations from the regulated party that wants to 
maintain its government funding. The non-materialistic, cognitive capture occurs when the regulator’s mindset is in 
sync with the regulated party due to intense lobbying (see e.g., Engstrom [2013]; Carpenter and Moss [2014]). 
Often, a lobbying coalition of “Baptists” (moral message) and “Bootleggers” (moneyed interests) forms and adopts 
both strategies to achieve their common goals (e.g., Yandle [1983]).!
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[2004]). It follows that new regulatory activity is unrelated or even positively related to the 
incidence of future corporate scandals, if those scandals benefit the special interests of the 
regulated firms (and, therefore, indirectly the self-interest of the regulators), or if managers are 
quick to adapt and shift their corporate wrongdoing to areas beyond the scope of the new 
regulation. Similarly, corporate scandals would not necessarily lead to an increase in the 
enactment of future regulations, and regulatory capture could even lead to a negative association 
with respect to future rule making.3 
A third perspective on regulators’ motivation is ideology (e.g., Kau and Rubin [1979, 1993]; 
Bernstein [1989]; Poole and Rosenthal [1996, 1997]; Lee, Moretti, and Butler [2004]). 
Ideological preferences, like a liberal versus conservative political leaning or a socialist versus 
capitalistic view of markets, can be used to explain many different regulatory actions. For 
instance, ideological opposition to markets might lead politicians to impose punitive legislation 
in the aftermath of a big corporate scandal, inducing a positive correlation between scandals and 
future regulatory interventions. Or, a Republican dominated U.S. Congress might pursue 
deregulation to further its political agenda, thereby potentially affecting the incidence of future 
scandals. In either case, the effectiveness of these regulations from a public interest view is 
unclear. Thus, on its own, this view is not of much help for the interpretation of the temporal 
patterns between corporate scandals and regulation. Yet, comparisons across countries and over 
time between more and less ideologically influenced regimes can provide insights into how 
special interest groups affect regulatory behavior (e.g., Rajan and Zingales [2003]). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Incomplete information, incompetence, or lack of funding of the regulator also might contribute to regulation being 
ineffective. Moreover, given the broad historical scope of this study, period-specific factors such as the absence of 
regulatory bodies and/or regulation must be taken into consideration when interpreting our results. For instance, 
specific and enforceable regulation for financial reporting was largely absent in Belgium before World War I (Van 
Overfelt, Deloof, and Vanstraelen [2010]). Similarly, there did not exist a national legislation on financial reporting 
in Australia until the second half of the 20th century, and accounting standards were initially developed by 
competing professional accounting bodies without a clear enforcement structure (Dean and Clarke [2011]). 
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To test the above ideas, we develop in this registered report a time series comprising 
episodes of corporate scandals and regulation for a global sample of 26 countries over the period 
1800 to 2015. We conduct the data collection in two steps. First, we use a coarse proxy of the 
underlying constructs and collect the number of times the terms “scandal” and “regulator” are 
mentioned in the leading (business) newspaper in each country and year. For instance, in the 
United Kingdom, we search for these two exact terms in the archive of the Financial Times from 
1888 to 2015; in Italy, we search the archive of La Stampa from 1867 onwards for a series of 
equivalent Italian terms (i.e., “scandalo” together with “regolatore” and “legislatore”). The idea 
behind this broad search is to see whether the general topics of scandals and regulation produce 
newsworthy stories without further analysis of the newspaper content. In a second step, we refine 
our search and out of all the articles identify those that cover actual accounting scandals (i.e., 
financial reporting behavior by firms that is deemed morally or legally wrong and causes public 
uproar). This step assumes to a certain degree that the press plays a role as a watchdog for 
corporate misconduct (Miller [2006]), and involves an extensive content analysis of historical 
newspaper articles.4 We collect data on accounting regulation from secondary literature and 
(official) depositories of the laws, rules, and voluntary conventions that cover financial reporting 
in a country. We use this information to create a country panel comprising the annual number of 
accounting scandals and regulations we identified in the press and from the other sources. We 
also code corporate scandals and regulations that go beyond the narrow scope of financial 
reporting but relate to firm value and the protection of minority investors. This large panel of 
historical data allows us to examine the lead-lag relations between corporate scandals and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 As the famous unravelling of Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme in 2008 illustrates, the watchdog role of the media is 
not obvious. Both the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the media only took a critical interest in 
Madoff after the markets forced him to liquidate his funds, despite repeated earlier attempts by whistle-blowers to 
alert the SEC and the press to his questionable investment practices (Markopolos [2010]). 
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regulations, and from the observed correlations we can then draw inferences against the 
backdrop of the theories of public interest, regulatory capture, and ideology of regulation.5 
We begin the analysis with descriptive evidence on the occurrence of corporate scandals and 
regulation over time. On an aggregate level, the media mentions of the terms “scandal” and 
“regulator” steadily increase from numbers in the double digits in the early 1800s to about 5,000 
just before World War II. The media mentions exponentially grow from 1946 onwards and 
exceed 34,000 in 2002 and 2006. The two time series are highly correlated, and closely mirror 
the expansion of wealth in the global economy, measured by the average gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita of the sample countries. The media mentions also spike during times of global 
financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff [2011]). Even though the numbers are markedly smaller 
when we focus on the actual incidents of corporate scandals and regulations, the general pattern 
we observe over time is very similar. There are, on average, 4.2 (2.4) episodes of corporate 
scandals (regulation) in any given year from 1800 to 1969, and this number increases to 33.1 
(14.7) over the 1970 to 2015 period. Thus, frequent scandals covered in newspapers and 
extensive regulation are a relatively recent phenomenon. At the same time, we observe different 
waves of scandals and regulation over time, for instance, around 1860 (U.K. banking crisis), 
1890 and 1905 (second industrial revolution), and 1930 (Great Depression). The years 1993 
(e.g., Metallgesellschaft, Montedison, Banco Español de Crédito) and 2002 (e.g., WorldCom, 
Dynegy, ComRoad) display the highest numbers of scandals (69 and 82).6 In total, we identify 
2,244 corporate scandals (888 of which are pure accounting scandals) and 1,081 regulations (613 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The various theories of regulation are not mutually exclusive but rather coexist in the same market and/or form 
intermediate cases (Shleifer [2005]). Moreover, even though our empirical strategy allows us to identify the 
direction of the relation, we caution that we cannot unequivocally attribute the observed serial correlations to a 
specific theory. 
6 See the Internet appendix (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2960069) for details on the data collection and the time-series 
pattern of media mentions, corporate scandals, and regulation for each of the 26 sample countries. 
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accounting regulations), or on average at least one corporate scandal (regulation) every 3.4 (4.9) 
years in a country. 
Going beyond a descriptive analysis, we next exploit the rich panel dimension of our data to 
examine the lead-lag relations between corporate scandals and regulations. Following Reinhart 
and Rogoff [2011], we test whether one time series is useful in forecasting the other after 
controlling for its own lagged values (Granger causality test). We find that the media mentions of 
both the terms “scandal” and “regulator” exhibit high positive autocorrelation, indicating that 
past mentions in the press are related to future mentions of the same term. Except for the most 
recent sample period (after 1970), the mentions of “scandal” lead the mentions of “regulator.” At 
the same time, the opposite relation holds, and mentions of “regulator” lead mentions of 
“scandal.” We find similar albeit statistically stronger patterns for actual episodes of corporate 
scandals and regulation. Both events exhibit a strong positive serial correlation. More to the 
point, corporate scandals are positively related to future regulation (even in our most restrictive 
model that includes year fixed effects), suggesting that they act as an antecedent to regulatory 
intervention. This correlation is consistent with regulators being less flexible and informed than 
firm managers and, consequently, taking a reactive approach to regulation. However, on its own, 
the relation does not tell us whether regulation has been effective. It could represent the 
benevolent regulator trying to quickly fix the problem, the captured regulator hiding behind 
regulatory activism, or the ideological regulator imposing an imprint. We also find that 
regulation acts as an antecedent to future scandals. This positive correlation suggests that 
regulators are not fully effective because, for instance, regulations are not properly enforced 
(e.g., Christensen, Hail, and Leuz [2013, 2016]), or firms might direct their misbehavior to areas 
outside the scope of the new regulation (e.g., Dye, Glover, and Sunder [2015]). Maybe only the 
7 
existence of explicit rules lets the regulator identify corporate actions as unlawful and in 
violation of public trust. The results are robust to controlling for economic development, 
inflation, the occurrence of financial crises, and country and year fixed effects. They also hold, 
but are weaker (particularly, for the relation of scandals leading regulation), when we limit the 
analyses to the subset of accounting scandals and accounting regulations. 
In additional analyses, we check for differential lead-lag relations between corporate 
scandals and regulation over time, across groups of countries, and for individual countries. We 
find that the leading role of scandals is only present after 1946, but then again vanishes in the 
early 1970s. Regulation acts as an antecedent to scandals both before and after World War II, but 
loses its predictive power in the most recent period after 1970. One issue with the last five 
decades is that corporate scandals and regulations become very frequent events, reducing the 
identification power of the tests. The leading role of scandals is more pronounced in emerging 
markets and countries with weak rule of law (based on the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny [1998] index).7 This finding is consistent with regulation being less able to curb the 
occurrence of future corporate scandals in those environments, even though the regulatory 
response—on paper—has been intense. We also find that the reactive role of regulation is 
particularly pronounced in English common law countries and German commercial code 
countries, but not present in countries with French legal tradition. German commercial code 
countries exhibit the largest positive correlation between current regulation and future scandals. 
In a country-by-country comparison, the leading role of corporate scandals is significant in 14 
out of 26 cases, most strongly in Israel, Greece, South Korea, and India. In all these countries, 
regulation is not significantly autocorrelated. Regulation is positively related to future scandals 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Partitions based on modern-day investor protection measures only reflect a snapshot, and do not capture the long-
term evolution of the legal forces shaping the functioning of capital markets (e.g., Franks, Mayer, and Rossi [2009]). 
8 
in 15 countries, most notably in Spain, Israel, Denmark, and Austria. Thus, our analyses point to 
systematic differences in the time-series pattern of corporate scandals and regulation in the cross-
section and over time, suggesting that the effectiveness of regulation is shaped by local 
institutional factors and fundamental country characteristics like market development and legal 
tradition. We also find evidence of spillover effects from past regulation and scandals across 
nations, for instance, from the United Kingdom or France to the other sample countries. 
Aside from a novel dataset and descriptive evidence on the historical evolution of corporate 
misbehavior and regulation of financial markets for a broad cross-section of countries around the 
globe, our study contributes to the better understanding of the history, role, and functioning of 
regulation (e.g., McCraw [1984]). As anecdotal evidence suggests and our data confirm, 
regulatory activity has a strong reactive component. This pattern is sometimes referred to as the 
“crisis theory” of regulation.8 Yet, we find no evidence that these regulations can curb corporate 
misconduct. Rather to the contrary, today’s regulations are a strong predictor of future fraudulent 
behavior, 9  be it because firm managers are quick to adapt and move their activities to 
unregulated areas, or—from a more benevolent perspective—because regulators rely on exactly 
defined rules to identify and prosecute corporate wrongdoing. Another explanation for the 
positive correlation could be that well-intended regulations “backfire” and lead to negative 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Some prominent examples for this crisis theory of regulation are the British Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 
that followed widespread business failures and bankruptcies (Littleton [1933]), the 1933/34 U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Acts on the heels of the 1929 Stock Market Crash and the Great Depression (e.g., Benston [1973]), the 
creation of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in the wake of riotous protests by disgruntled 
investors during the infamous Shenzhen “8.10 incident” in 1992 (e.g., Wei [2009]), or the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
passed in 2002 amid corporate scandals like Enron, WorldCom, etc. (e.g., Ball [2009]). 
9 Historically, several major (accounting) regulations preceded major corporate scandals. For example, the British 
Bubble Act was enacted in June 1720 before the bursting of the South Sea Bubble in September and October of the 
same year (e.g., Harris [1994]; Waymire and Basu [2007]). The U.K. Railway Regulation Act of 1844 preceded the 
Railway Mania of 1845/47 (Arnold and McCartney [2003]). Mandatory fair value reporting stipulated in the 
German Commercial Code of 1861 was reversed after fair values were found to contribute to a financial market 
bubble and crisis (“Gründerkrise”) in the early 1870s (e.g., Richard [2005]; Hoffmann and Detzen [2013]). 
9 
unintended consequences (Merton [1936]).10 Regardless of the motive, our evidence shows that 
corporate scandals follow past attempts at regulatory reform, which begs the question of how to 
break this “vicious cycle” of scandals followed by bouts of regulatory activism without 
consideration of the long-term effects on the economy as a whole (Waymire and Basu [2011]; 
see also Nobes [1991]). Finally, our study can be seen as adding the field of accounting to the 
transdisciplinary area of cliodynamics, which encompasses the mathematical modelling of 
historical processes and the construction and analysis of large historical databases. 
This paper was part of the Registration-based Editorial Process (REP) implemented by JAR 
for its 2017 conference. The registered report covers the variable definitions, data collection 
procedures and research design (section 2), the data description and graphical analyses (section 
3), the main lead-lag regressions of corporate scandals and regulation including the analysis of 
media mentions (section 4), and the analysis of different sub-periods from 1800 to 2015 (section 
5.1). The analysis of various sub-sets of the 26 sample countries (section 5.2) and the country-
by-country analysis (section 5.3) are planned supplementary tests. The robustness checks in table 
7 and the tests for potential spillover effects across jurisdictions (section 5.4) are unplanned, and 
we added them after the conference. Section 6 concludes. We provide further details on the data 
collection and the individual countries in the Internet appendix. 
2. Data Collection and Research Design 
In this section, we develop a definition of our two main theoretical constructs, corporate 
(accounting) scandals and (accounting) regulation. We then describe how we apply the two 
definitions in the data collection procedure. We conclude by outlining the basic research design 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 For examples of negative unintended consequences of recent accounting regulations, see Bushee and Leuz [2005], 
Leuz, Triantis, and Wang [2008], or Gao, Wu, and Zimmerman [2009]. 
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that we use to examine the lead-lag structure between corporate scandals and regulation in our 
global panel dataset. 
2.1. DEFINITIONS OF CORPORATE SCANDALS AND REGULATION 
For the purposes of this study, we start with a theoretical focus on corporate scandals and 
regulations in the area of financial reporting and accounting, but then in the data collection 
broaden the scope of our search to also include related scandals and regulations that might affect 
the personal wealth and legal status of minority investors. We define an “accounting scandal” as 
the alleged or actual financial reporting behavior of a firm (or multiple firms) that is publicly 
condemned as morally or legally wrong and causes shock and upset among the general public. 
This definition contains several key elements.11 First, for a scandal to be an accounting scandal, 
it must somehow relate to management’s use of the financial reporting system in a way that 
objectively misrepresents the firm’s underlying economics. Such aggressive reporting practices 
include, but are not limited to, overstating corporate assets and revenues, understating or 
omitting liabilities and expenses, and the use of complex accounting methods or operating 
structures to obfuscate and misdirect the flow of company funds.12 
Second, for the accounting practices to be scandalous, they have to be condemned as 
morally or legally wrong. Going beyond the traditional statutorily-derived definition of financial 
misconduct (e.g., Karpoff, Koester, Lee, and Martin [2017]), the expression “morally wrong” 
refers to practices that attract intense public scrutiny or criticism, irrespective of their legality or 
conformity with contemporary accounting principles. An example would be the public outcry 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 We derive our definition from various sources explaining the terms scandal (http://www.merriam-webster.com), 
accounting scandal (Jones [2011]), corporate fraud (Dyck, Morse, and Zingales [2010, 2014]), or financial 
misconduct (Karpoff, Koester, Lee, and Martin [2017]). 
12 The narrow definition of accounting scandals excludes other types of corrupt corporate behavior (e.g., insider 
trading, bribery, tax evasion, etc.) without an explicit financial reporting angle. However, we categorize these 
actions as other scandals (see section 2.2.2) and include them in our analyses. 
11 
that accompanied Enron’s mark-to-market accounting for its energy trading business that lacked 
quoted prices and, therefore, allowed for largely discretionary valuations as well as its use of 
special purpose entities to shift legal liabilities off the balance sheet—both practices were largely 
within the boundaries of GAAP. The term “legally wrong” refers to accounting fraud, that is, 
intentional acts by individuals or management that occur outside of the regulatory framework 
and result in material misrepresentations of financial statements. If not yet proven, fraud is only 
alleged. An example of fraud that started out as alleged in the initial media coverage but then 
turned into actual fraud would be the backdating of employee stock options by U.S. tech 
companies in the mid 2000s. 
Third, for the general public to be sufficiently shocked and upset, the accounting practices 
need to be economically significant and a prominent subject of the public discussion. Both 
aspects are difficult to define in precise terms. The first part, economic significance, is related to 
the concept of materiality in accounting, and means that the reporting misstatements must have 
the potential to mislead corporate outsiders in their decision-making. The second part requires 
the accounting practices to be a topic of discussion among, for instance, regulators, politicians, 
the business press, and the broader media. 
The second construct underlying our analysis is “accounting regulation.” 13 !Generally 
speaking, regulation refers to the legal imposition of formal rules with the intent to modify the 
economic behavior of firms or individuals. Regulation takes various forms (e.g., Shleifer [2005]; 
Ball [2009]; Sunder [2016]); through explicit legislation, by the power of the courts like in 
common law countries, or by tasking government administrative bodies and/or private entities 
with the coordination, implementation, and monitoring of the rules. Accounting regulation is the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 We draw our definition from several sources like the OECD (https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3295), 
La Porta et al. [1998], La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer [2006], and Leuz and Wysocki [2016]. 
12 
field of national and supranational laws, rules, and conventions that cover the preparation, 
content, presentation, and dissemination of accounting information, typically in the form of 
published financial statements. In a broader sense, it also encompasses regulation rendering 
financial statements more useful like rules on insider trading, the protection of shareholders and 
creditors, or the recovery of damages when the disclosed information is wrong or incomplete. 
Accounting regulation derives from many sources, including company laws, securities laws, 
stock exchange-imposed requirements, legal precedents, and generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP).14 We consider rules applicable to all publicly listed firms as well as industry-
specific regulations where appropriate (e.g., due to their formative influence on broader 
regulations like the 1868 Regulation of Railways Act in the U.K., or because of their wide 
bearing within the industry like the risk disclosure requirements under the third pillar of the 
Basel II accord for financial services firms). Whenever possible, we include self-regulation like 
the formation of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants or the Swiss Foundation 
for Reporting Recommendations. Such self-regulatory organizations were particularly relevant in 
the early sample period. We further include important auditing regulations (e.g., U.S. Auditing 
Standard no. 2 on the audit of internal control over financial reporting) as well as tax laws when 
there is conformity between book and tax accounting (e.g., the Municipal Income Tax Act of 
1928 in Sweden that implicitly linked the two sets of accounts). 
The notion of materiality also applies to accounting regulation. We regard the introduction 
of regulatory acts as material if they lead to substantive changes in the year-to-year reported 
accounting numbers or to an extension (reduction) of public filings and disclosures. The 2005 
mandatory adoption of IFRS for firms traded on regulated markets in the European Union (EU) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 We do not consider social norms or informal relations like trust that might determine accounting practices and 
investor protection (e.g., Sunder [2005]; Franks, Mayer, and Rossi [2009]) unless they were codified and available 
in written form. 
13 
would be a prime example of a regulatory change that had far-reaching consequences for firms’ 
reporting. SFAS 87 in 1985 on employers’ accounting for pensions or SFAS 141 in 2002 on the 
accounting for business combinations under U.S. GAAP would be other examples (see e.g., 
Balsam, Haw, and Lilien [1995]).15 
2.2. COLLECTION OF DATA ON CORPORATE SCANDALS AND REGULATION 
Based on the above conceptual definitions, we develop a data collection protocol that allows 
us to operationally grasp our two constructs, and apply it to a broad cross-section of countries 
over a long time series. We distinguish between the sources that we rely on to gather the data, 
and the classification of the collected data. This procedure leads to the initial sample available 
for the empirical analyses. 
2.2.1. Data Sources. To identify the sources for the data collection, we build on the work of 
existing studies on the topic (e.g., International Practice Executive Committee [1975]; Waymire 
and Basu [2007, 2011]; Previts, Walton, and Wolnizer [2010]; Jones [2011]) and collect 
extensive new materials from diverse primary and secondary sources. We then carefully scour 
each source for relevant events. Specifically, we perform the following three steps: (1) we review 
the related literature, (2) we systematically search the leading (business) newspapers in each 
country, and (3) we contact local experts for advice regarding additional materials and resources. 
In the first step, we survey the academic and practitioner literature through a keyword search 
of library catalogues, online databases, and the use of Internet search engines. For each source, 
we conduct both a general cross-country search and a targeted search of individual countries 
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15 To illustrate how we apply the materiality criterion, consider the many changes to U.S. accounting standards in 
the area of employee stock options (e.g., APB 25 in 1972, SFAS 123 in 1995, SFAS 123R in 2004). We only 
include the last change, SFAS 123R, in our data of U.S. regulations, because it was a change that drew intense 
public interest and ultimately had a big impact on firm’s financials by requiring the expensing of employee stock 
options. 
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using a comprehensive list of terms (or their local equivalents).16 The literature review yields 
numerous cross-country surveys and individual country studies in the form of books, journal 
articles, and websites. The episodes of corporate scandals and regulation identified through this 
review of secondary sources serve as the starting point for the coding of our database. 
The second step comprises a systematic archival search of the historical editions of the local 
business press and other media outlets. For each sample country, we identify one or multiple 
leading daily newspapers (ideally with a business focus), and search their electronic archives 
using the same keywords (or their local equivalents) as listed above. Table 1 provides an 
overview of the newspaper outlets used by country, and lists their accessibility and the period 
covered by each source.17 For instance, in France, our primary sources are the historical archives 
of Le Figaro (1826 to 1942) and Le Monde (1945 to 2015), two of the leading newspapers over 
time. We complement these general interest outlets with searches in the financial and business 
centric newspapers Journal des Finances and Les Échos, when these were available. In most 
cases, we hire and train research assistants at local universities to help us with this search. If 
electronically searchable newspaper archives are not available, we use hardcopies, microfilm 
versions, or electronic copies instead, and adapt our search strategy such that we still can identify 
the major corporate scandals in a country. For instance, in Portugal there are no electronically 
searchable newspaper archives available for large parts of the sample period. Thus, we skimmed 
every Friday edition or, when newspaper length shortened in the early years, the daily front page 
and business section of the newspaper Diário de Notícias on location at the National Library of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Specifically, we use the following keywords: “accounting scandal,” “accounting fraud,” “corporate scandal,” 
“corporate fraud,” “financial misconduct,” “accounting manipulation,” “earnings management,” “earnings 
manipulation,” “creative accounting,” “accounting regulation,” “disclosure regulation,” “securities regulation,” and 
“securities law.” In addition to the direct translations of these terms, we also use country-specific keywords such as 
“Companies Act” in the U.K. or “Securities and Exchange Act” in South Korea. 
17 We contact local academics to ensure that we use appropriate news outlets and translations of the terms in our 
search list of the online databases and news archives. Similarly, we investigate how the search terms might have 
changed over time due to the long sample period. 
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Portugal in Lisbon for events. For each potential scandal (and regulation) we identified, we 
conducted additional research to better understand the issues and help us with its classification. 
We also ensured that at least two members of the research team independently classified every 
scandal (and regulation), and then discussed and resolved the cases with disagreements. 
In the third step, we contact local accounting experts, legal historians, or professional 
organizations to seek help identifying additional resources and gauging the quality of the data. 
That is, after we have assembled the initial dataset based on primary and secondary resources 
and reviewed it for consistency, we asked a local expert to assess the completeness and 
plausibility of the entries. For example, in the U.K., we contacted the financial reporting faculty 
at the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) to help us review the 
U.K. dataset. We provide additional details on the secondary literature, the keyword search, the 
data sources, and the data collection for each sample country in the Internet appendix. 
2.2.2. Data Classification. Because of the broad search terms, the identification of source 
materials yields a large number of corporate scandals and regulatory changes. This trove of data 
needs further vetting. To narrow our focus on scandals that are consistent with the conceptual 
definition, we ask the following four questions for each event: (1) Does the event involve one or 
more financial reporting practices? (2) Are these practices either morally wrong (e.g., aggressive 
or creative accounting) or legally wrong (i.e., alleged or actual accounting fraud) under local 
customs or jurisdiction? (3) Does the event trigger material (negative) consequences for 
corporate outsiders such as a drop in share prices, or subsequent bankruptcy? (4) Does the event 
cause a public outcry and discussion as witnessed by prominent coverage in local newspaper 
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outlets and subsequent examination in secondary literature? Only if we can affirmatively answer 
all four questions do we classify the event as a pure accounting scandal.18 
If a corporate scandal does not directly involve financial reporting practices (or financial 
reporting only plays a minor role) and fails the first criterion (but meets the other three criteria), 
we classify it either as near accounting scandal or as other scandal. Near accounting scandals are 
incidents which do not involve material misrepresentations of financial statements, but for which 
accounting information likely played an important part in forming market participants’ 
expectations about the firm. An example would be the asset stripping ploy that became famous 
as the “bottom of the harbor” tax avoidance scheme in Australia of the 1970s. It involved the 
engineering of financial accounts, but defrauding tax authorities was the main goal. We classify 
corporate scandals without an explicit or implicit accounting angle (e.g., insider trading, bribery, 
theft, investment schemes, etc.) that nonetheless have the potential to affect future regulation as 
other scandals. A famous historical example pre-dating our sample period would be the South 
Sea Bubble in 1720 that resulted in highly inflated prices of the South Sea Company stock (e.g., 
Waymire and Basu [2007]; Goetzmann, Labio, Rouwenhorst, and Young [2013]). Table 2 
illustrates how we apply the above criteria with examples of U.K. events that we classified into 
the various categories of corporate scandals. 
We apply similar principles to regulatory acts. We classify all laws, standards, and 
conventions dealing with the recognition and/or disclosure of corporate events in the financial 
reporting system as accounting regulation in a narrow sense. To assess materiality, we rely on 
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18 Traditionally, financial misconduct includes actions such as the forced restatement of financial reports, securities 
class action lawsuits, or accounting and auditing enforcement releases by, e.g., the U.S. SEC or the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission. Our definition subsumes those cases but only if they are substantive enough and cause 
public outcry and discussion. Thus, we end up with only a small fraction of the cases shown in Karpoff et al. [2017] 
for the U.S. or in Hung, Wong, and Zhang [2015] for China. 
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accounting textbooks, legal texts, publications by the big international audit firms, local experts 
as well as on the extent of coverage of the regulatory acts in the business press. 
We further distinguish between national and supranational regulation. The latter category 
encompasses regulatory acts that are decided upon by international governmental or private 
organizations (e.g., the European Commission, or the International Accounting Standards Board 
IASB), and subsequently agreed upon and adopted in the signing countries or transposed into 
national law. An example is the Transparency Directive passed by the EU legislature in 2004 that 
addresses corporate reporting and disclosure issues for firms traded on regulated EU markets. 
For these supranational regulations, the link between local economic conditions and the 
enactment of the law should be less pronounced (Christensen, Hail, and Leuz [2016]). Similarly, 
we expect weaker links between scandals and local regulations when the regulatory activity is 
heavily influenced by international events (e.g., the dissemination of the French Code through 
the Napoleonic wars) or colonial ties (e.g., the influence of British law in Australia or Canada), 
but we do not separately code these cross-country events (see also section 5.4 for evidence on 
potential cross-country spillover effects). We classify regulatory acts that do not directly cover 
financial reporting practices but still render financial statements more useful to corporate 
outsiders as other regulation. An example is the Prevention of Fraud Act enacted by the U.K. 
Parliament in 1939 to regulate the proliferation of newly listed companies at the time. 
2.3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Our basic research design follows from Reinhart and Rogoff [2009, 2011].19 The idea is to 
examine the lead-lag relations between our two main variables of interest, corporate scandals and 
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19 Reinhart and Rogoff [2009, 2011] study the temporal patterns of debt and banking crises, stock market crashes, 
inflation and currency crises. Their study covers 70 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North 
America, and Oceania and spans the period from 1800 to 2009. 
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regulation, to determine whether one time series is useful in forecasting the other after 
controlling for its own lagged values (Granger [1969] causality test). That is, we model the time 
series of corporate scandals as a function of its own past values and the past values of regulatory 
actions, and vice versa. The observed relations tell us something about the “predictive causality” 
between the two constructs. If past corporate scandals are related to future regulatory actions, we 
interpret this association as suggesting that lawmakers and regulators reacted ex post to corporate 
misbehavior. If past regulations are related to future corporate scandals, the association indicates 
that firm managers or owners are quick to avoid the new regulatory interventions and move to 
unregulated areas, regulators engage in regulatory activism, or regulators require explicit rules to 
become active, and detect and prosecute corporate misbehavior. Alternatively, the positive 
relation could point to negative unintended consequences of regulation. 
Specifically, we estimate the following two separate equations based on the modified vector 
autoregression (VAR) in Reinhart and Rogoff [2011] for the analysis: 
(1) SCANDALit = !10 + !11SCANDALi[t–1 to t–3] + !12REGULATIONi[t–1 to t–3]  
+ " !1j Controlsjt–1 + " !1k Fixed Effectsk + u1it 
(2) REGULATIONit = !20 + !21SCANDALi[t–1 to t–3] + !22REGULATIONi[t–1 to t–3]  
+ " !2j Controlsjt–1 + " !2k Fixed Effectsk + u2it. 
In this expression, SCANDALit stands for a binary indicator variable that takes on a value of 
‘1’ if a new corporate scandal is discovered in country i and year t. We measure scandals in the 
year they are first discussed in the financial press and media, which might be different from the 
year that the misbehavior took place. However, to shape public opinion and motivate regulators 
to take actions (e.g., Miller [2006]), markets must be aware of the wrongdoing. REGULATIONit 
is a binary variable that takes on a value of ‘1’ if there is a new regulation enacted in country i 
and year t, and ‘0’ otherwise. We measure regulation at the time it is enacted, which is less 
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subjective because we can more easily determine these dates for the historical time series. 
However, the entry-into-force date might be several months or even years past the initial 
discussion and the drafting of the regulation, at which time we would have expected the relation 
between past scandals and the incentives of the rule makers to be most pronounced.20 
In both equations, we include a single lag of the three-year backward-looking moving 
average of the two dependent variables, SCANDALi[t–1 to t–3] and REGULATIONi[t–1 to t–3]. These 
two lagged variables give rise to our coefficients of interest. If scandals are persistent, we expect 
!11 to be positive; a negative sign is consistent with corporate scandals coming and going in 
waves. !12 is a proxy for the predictive ability of regulation. A negative sign indicates that newly 
introduced regulation reduces the incidence of corporate scandals, which we would interpret as 
effective regulation from a public interest perspective. A positive coefficient suggests a leading 
role of regulation for the incidence and detection of future corporate misbehavior. In Eq. (2), !21 
captures the nature of a regulator’s reaction; a positive sign suggests that lawmakers and 
regulators react, ex post, to corporate misbehavior. That is, they did not see it coming, for 
instance, because they were less informed or notoriously late. The interpretation of a negative (or 
insignificant) sign is more ambiguous, but could indicate that regulators are captured by their 
constituents, and do not react or even curb regulatory efforts in response to corporate 
misbehavior. The coefficient !22 reveals something about the inner workings of the regulatory 
process. If regulation is purely ad hoc and primarily driven by economic conditions, we would 
not expect a significant association. A positive sign suggests an increasing trend in regulatory 
activity, consistent with a self-interested regulator attempting to increase his realm (Peltzman 
[1976]). It is also consistent with prior regulation not being enough and requiring amendments or 
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20 To allow for such a potential delay, we rerun the analysis by further lagging the moving average variables by one 
or two more years. The results are very similar and none of the inferences change (see also the sensitivity tests in 
table 7). 
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new regulation to resolve pressing issues. A negative coefficient indicates mean reversion in 
regulatory activity. 
In the base specification, we include lagged values of log transformed GDP per capita and 
inflation as time-varying, country-specific control variables plus country fixed effects. We 
include them to control for cross-sectional differences in economic development and general 
economic conditions. GDP captures economic growth including the wealth of the economy and 
the development of capital markets (La Porta et al. [1998]). Inflation captures macroeconomic 
stability and often coincides with exchange rate crises, debt and banking crises (Reinhart and 
Rogoff [2011]). In some specifications, we further include a control for the occurrence of a 
financial crisis in a country as well as year fixed effects. The year-fixed-effects estimation is 
conservative, as the yearly dummy variables account for general trends in the data inclusive of 
those related to our variables of interest. We estimate the equations with logit regressions and 
report statistical significance levels based on robust standard errors clustered by country. 
3. Data Description and Graphical Analyses 
In this section, we discuss the sample construction and provide descriptive statistics on the 
number of corporate scandals and regulations by country and year. We then analyze the data 
using graphical plots to get a better understanding of the historical development of the two main 
constructs under study and their interrelations over time. We conclude the section with an 
illustrative description of the data structure for select sample countries. 
3.1. SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION AND DESCRIPTION 
We start with Jones [2011] for our sample selection process. In his book, he identifies and 
describes accounting scandals occurring in 12 different countries, spanning Asia, Europe, North 
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America, and Oceania. We supplement this list with the 11 next largest countries in terms of 
GDP that are part of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).21 
Finally, we add Brazil, Egypt, and South Africa to also include representatives from Latin 
America and Africa in the sample. This procedure yields our final sample of 26 countries. 
We apply our data collection protocol to the sample countries as far back as 1800 if 
possible.22 For each country, we construct an input database that contains the number and types 
of corporate scandals and regulations in a given year together with a short description and a 
reference pointing to the original source material. For the analyses, we use the raw data to create 
the two variables SCANDAL and REGULATION that we code as ‘1’ if we identified at least one 
incident of corporate scandals or accounting regulations in a country and year.23 
In table 3, we provide descriptive statistics on the sample that results after our data 
collection. Panel A reports the starting year, the number of country-year observations, and the 
incidents of corporate scandals and regulation on a country-by-country basis. Except for Israel 
(1932), Poland (1920), and South Korea (1920), all the historical time series start in the 19th 
century, going back as far as 1800 for Austria, Switzerland, and the U.K. The maximum time 
series per country is 216 years with a mean of 157 years. This expansive historical data is 
essential for the power of the statistical tests. The total sample comprises 4,071 country years. In 
terms of count, the U.S., Japan, and the U.K. exhibit the highest number of corporate scandals, 
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21 Mexico, Norway, and Turkey also rank among the OEDC countries with high GDP, but could not be included in 
the sample. Similarly, Argentina, which is not a member of the OECD but has a larger GDP than some of the sample 
countries, is not included. Unfortunately, after multiple attempts with several research assistants we were unable to 
collect reliable newspaper data on scandals for these four countries, so that we had to drop them from our original 
research proposal submitted to the REP. 
22 For some countries, data on corporate scandals and regulation are available even before 1800. However, in most 
cases we cannot systematically gather data until the second half of the 19th century. Thus, we set the country-specific 
sample period to the later of 1800 or the initial year with reliable newspaper and/or secondary literature coverage. 
23 We identified only 13 events in the data collection that clearly can be characterized as deregulation (i.e., a 
substantial loosening or repeal of existing regulation). We did not include these events in the main analyses. 
However, if we do and code deregulations as ‘-1’ to re-estimate the model with multinomial logistic regressions, the 
results are virtually unaffected (not tabulated), and none of the inferences change. 
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with more than 200 incidents each. At the other end of the spectrum, we have Israel and Finland 
with 15 and 16 cases, respectively. The total number of corporate scandals we could identify is 
2,244. On average, we count 86 cases per country (of which 34 are pure accounting scandals). 
One caveat with the interpretation of these numbers is that in some cases, episodes that involve 
multiple firms—sometimes in the hundreds—are lumped into a single event (e.g., the 1845 U.K. 
Railway Mania, 1873 Gründerkrise in Germany, or 2014 Operação Lava Jato in Brazil). In terms 
of regulatory activity, the total number is 1,081 (mean of 42 events per country) with 613 (mean 
of 24) having a direct impact on firms’ financial reporting. Italy is the country for which we 
identified the greatest number of regulatory events (63), while Poland had the fewest (19). 
In panel B of table 3, we report the number of country-year observations together with the 
incidents of corporate scandals and regulation by decade. The number of corporate scandals is 
very low in the early years, which also is a function of having fewer sample countries at the time. 
It then gradually increases until the 1960s (with a peak during the Great Depression around 
1930). Over the last 45 years, the number of corporate scandals surges and reaches a peak with 
82 cases in 2002 (1993 with 69 cases is the second most populated year). The time-series pattern 
for regulatory activity is similar. 2005 (51 events) and 2002 (33 events) are the years for which 
we could identify the most regulations. On average, there are 4.2 (2.4) episodes of corporate 
scandals (regulation) in any given year from 1800 to 1969, and this number increases to 33.1 
(14.7) over the 1970 to 2015 period. 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the binary SCANDAL and REGULATION variables 
used in the regression analyses. The variables are coded such that any incident of scandal or 
regulation in a country and year sets the indicator variable to ‘1’. We observe pure accounting 
scandals (as indicated by the suffix _acctg) in 13 percent of the country-years. Adding near 
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accounting scandals (_acctg+near) raises this proportion to 20 percent; and including other 
scandals (_tot) to 29 percent. The numbers for pure accounting regulation (_acctg), accounting 
plus other corporate governance and/or investor protection regulation (_acctg+oth), and all 
regulation including supranational agreements and laws (_tot) are 13, 20, and 21 percent, 
respectively. These percentages suggest that we observe, on average, every 3.4 (4.9) years at 
least one corporate scandal (regulation) in a country. The table also contains descriptive statistics 
on the media mentions of scandals and regulation and the control variables for economic 
development (GDP per Capita), Inflation, and Financial Crisis, which we describe in more 
detail below. 
3.2. GRAPHICAL PLOTS OF CORPORATE SCANDALS AND REGULATION 
First, we use a coarse proxy of the underlying constructs and collect the annual number of 
times the terms “scandal” and “regulator” (or the local equivalents) are mentioned in the leading 
(business) newspaper in each country. The idea behind this broad search is to see whether the 
general topics of corporate scandals and regulation produce newsworthy stories without further 
analysis of the specific content of the articles. For instance, in the United Kingdom, we search 
for the two exact terms in the archive of the Financial Times from 1888 to 2015; in Italy, we 
search the archive of La Stampa from 1867 onwards for a series of equivalent Italian terms (i.e., 
“scandalo” together with “regolatore” and “legislatore”); in the Netherlands, we search the 
Algemeen Handelsblad beginning in 1828 using the Dutch terms for scandal and supervisory 
body/company law (i.e., “schandaal” and “toezichthouder”, “ondernemingsrecht”, “wet” in 
combination with “onderneming”, “firma”, “compagnie”, or “vennootschap”). See also table 1 
for the newspaper resources and the Internet appendix for the exact keywords used. 
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In figure 1, we plot the aggregate number of media mentions of the two terms over the 1800 
to 2015 period. The graph is based on 24 (out of 26) countries because we have no media 
mentions data for Portugal and Egypt. To provide context, we include the country-median GDP 
per capita in the graph and highlight periods of global financial crises.24 The figure allows the 
following insights: First, the mentions of scandal and regulator follow a distinct pattern over 
time. They grow almost proportionately over many years at low rates, but start to exponentially 
increase beginning after World War II. This pattern could reflect the fewer accessible newspaper 
sources in the early decades, sample bias from adding more countries over time, or longer 
newspapers with more articles and heightened media attention to the two topics in recent years. 
However, as the strong positive correlation between media mentions and GDP per capita (97 
percent) suggests, there might also exist some common underlying forces such as economic 
development or the growing role of capital markets over time that might jointly determine the 
evolution of the two time-series. Second, the media mentions of scandal and regulator closely 
mirror each other. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the two time series is close to 99 
percent over the entire period and only slightly smaller for various sub-periods. This strong 
comovement suggests that the two constructs are often mentioned in the same context, 
supporting our notion of the press as a watchdog (Miller [2006]). Third, there exist discernible 
waves in the mentions of scandal and regulator by the press, and they tend to coincide with 
financial crises. We observe a surge in media mentions around 1910 (various national crises like 
the panic of 1907 in the U.S. or the 1910 rubber stock crisis in China), in the 1930s (Great 
Depression), 1973 (oil crisis), 1987 (Black Monday stock market crash), early 2000s (burst of 
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24 We define global financial crises as years in which more than two-thirds of the sample countries at the time 
experienced at least one crisis of the following type: bank crisis, stock market crash, currency crisis, inflation crisis, 
or sovereign debt crisis (source: Reinhart and Rogoff [2011]). 
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the dot-com bubble), etc. Thus, newspaper outlets seem to be a timely source for our underlying 
constructs. 
Next, we refine the analyses and focus on the episodes of actual corporate scandals and 
regulation. That is, we zoom in on those events that we could identify in our extensive content 
analysis of the newspaper coverage, and plot the aggregate yearly numbers for the 26 sample 
countries in figure 2. Panel A shows results for all kinds of corporate scandals and regulatory 
actions; panel B limits the plot to pure accounting scandals and regulations. The time-series 
patterns closely resemble the media mentions. The incidents of corporate scandals steadily grow 
but remain at substantially lower levels until about the 1970s, when the numbers start to starkly 
increase. Scandals reach their highest level in 1993 (e.g., Metallgesellschaft, Montedison, Banco 
Español de Crédito) and 2002 (e.g., Enron, Worldcom, Dynegy, ComRoad). The heightened 
frequency of corporate scandals in recent years is highlighted by the shaded area in the graphs. 
We define periods of global corporate scandals as years in which more than half of the sample 
countries experienced at least one episode of scandal. Except for 1931, they all occur after 1988. 
We observe several waves in corporate scandals going back as early as the 1860s (U.K. banking 
crisis), 1890 and 1905 (second industrial revolution), and the 1930s (Great Depression). The 
regulatory activity follows a similar path, consistent with the notion that regulation has become 
much more prevalent today than it was 100 years ago (Shleifer [2005]). The correlation between 
the incidents of scandals and regulation is high, with 87 percent over the entire period and 
between 64 to 78 percent over various sub-periods. 
The time-series pattern for accounting scandals and regulation in panel B is very similar, but 
at lower levels. Notably, we could not identify many accounting scandals before 1900 (only 63 
cases), and the vast majority took place after 1960 (701 cases). This finding does not come as a 
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surprise as strict and enforceable regulation regarding financial reporting often was absent before 
the 1930s (e.g., in the U.S. before the 1933/34 Securities and Exchange Acts). Aside from being 
unspecific and broad, early accounting regulation often came in the form of social norms, 
voluntary agreements, and systems of self-regulation (e.g., Waymire and Basu [2007]), which 
were difficult to uniformly implement and enforce. Moreover, the increasing role of capital 
markets, long boom periods of rising stock prices, market pressure on management to perform in 
the short-run, executive compensation tied to stock prices, etc. has made the accounting system 
more prone to fraudulent behavior in recent decades (e.g., Ball [2009]). Despite the high time-
series correlations between scandals and regulation in both figures 1 and 2, the graphical analysis 
does not allow insights into the lead-lag structure between the two constructs. 
3.3. EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY DATA 
To get a better understanding of our data structure, we provide graphical details on the 
corporate scandal and regulation data for four sample countries. For each country, we plot the 
time series of media mentions of the terms “scandal” and “regulator” (as solid and dashed lines) 
together with the yearly incidents of corporate scandals and regulations that met our definition 
(vertical bars). In figure 3, we plot the results for the United Kingdom over the 1800 to 2015 
period. The time series of media mentions does not start until 1888, the founding year of the 
Financial Times, which we use as our main newspaper resource in the U.K. The media mentions 
display the already documented exponential growth beginning in the early 1970s. 25  The 
correlation between the two time series of media mentions is high (92 percent) over the entire 
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25 The pattern of media mentions remains largely the same if we include the broader terms “fraud” and “regulation” 
in the search. Similarly, if we scale the number of media mentions by the total number of articles published in the 
Financial Times in a year (to address concerns about the broadening scope of newspaper coverage over time), the 
pattern is largely unchanged. 
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period, but non-existent before World War II. The pattern of actual scandals and regulation is 
more balanced in the U.K. than in the full sample as about half the incidents occur before 1970. 
Figure 4 displays the data structure for the United States over the 1851 to 2015 period. The 
media mentions of scandals in The New York Times are very volatile, and we observe multiple 
waves over time, the first in 1870, the second around the turn of the century, the third around 
1930, and then again in the mid 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Thereafter the level of media mentions 
of both terms substantially increases. The correlation between the two time-series is on the order 
of 70 percent for the entire period and after World War II, but only 25 percent before 1946. The 
pattern of actual scandals and regulation largely mimics the media mentions, with select 
individual cases over long stretches of the sample period and a substantial increase after 1970. 
2002 is a banner year with 26 cases of corporate scandals and 4 regulatory events. 
Figure 5 reports the data structure for China over the 1878 to 2015 period. We use the two 
newspapers Shen Bao (until 1948) and People’s Daily (from 1949) as our main resources for the 
data collection. China is as an example of a country that historically has been subject to strong 
government control over the press, ideology-driven political agenda setting, and central planning 
of the economy. Thus, it is not obvious whether the same patterns would emerge as in some of 
the western markets. However, the data reveal very similar time-series attributes. The number of 
media mentions displays three notable peaks, the first in 1934 (spike in World silver price), the 
second in 1946 (hyper-inflation), and the third and most sustained in 2004 (corporate scandals). 
The correlation between the mentions of scandal and regulator is strongly positive over the entire 
period and over the various sub-periods (always higher than 67 percent). The occurrence of 
actual scandals closely mimics the pattern of media mentions and is similar to the more market-
based economies (i.e., only 29 cases before 1990 and 98 cases thereafter). 
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Figure 6 plots the data structure for Italy over the 1860 to 2015 period. La Stampa, one of 
the oldest daily newspapers in Italy, serves as the primary data source. The two time series of 
media mentions move closely together (correlation of 92 percent), are volatile with several peaks 
over the course of the years, and generally display the familiar pattern. Notably, the incidents of 
actual scandals and regulation closely follow the media mentions. There are groups of scandals 
(and surges in media mentions) around 1910, 1930, and on a more persistent basis after 1950. 
Both actual corporate scandals and media mentions of scandals peak in 1993 (e.g., Montedison, 
Eni, Finmeccanica). We can use the year 1993 to illustrate our research question. The issue 
becomes whether the accumulation of scandals in this year served as trigger for future regulatory 
action, for instance, the two rules put in place in 1995. Alternatively, the scandals of 1993 could 
be an outcome of prior regulations, like the rules enacted over the years 1990 to 1992. We turn to 
a statistical analysis of such lead-lag relations in the next section. 
4. Temporal Patterns of Corporate Scandals and Regulation 
4.1. MENTIONS OF “SCANDAL” AND “REGULATOR” IN THE BUSINESS PRESS 
We start the empirical tests with an analysis of the temporal patterns of the media mentions 
of “scandal” and “regulator.” Even though these proxies are noisy and potentially biased, they 
can give us an indication of the lead-lag structure of the underlying theoretical constructs. We 
estimate the models in Eq. (1) and (2), but instead of using binary indicator variables we use the 
log transformed numbers of the yearly media mentions in a country as the dependent variables. 
Similarly, we compute the lagged moving averages from three years of media mentions and then 
log transform them for the estimation. This specification implicitly puts more weight on scandals 
and regulations that received more media attention and likely were more important (e.g., the 
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1933/34 U.S. Securities and Exchange Acts or the 2001 Enron scandal). The models control for 
economic development, inflation, and country fixed effects. Annual GDP per Capita (in 1990 
international dollars) is from the Maddison-Project; yearly Inflation from the online resources to 
Reinhart and Rogoff [2011]. 26  We estimate the models with ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression and assess the statistical significance based on robust standard errors clustered by 
country. 
Table 5 presents OLS coefficients and (in parentheses) t-statistics from estimating the two 
models, first over the entire sample period (1800-2015), and then consecutively over the first half 
of the sample (1800-1945), the second half of the sample (1946-2015), and the most recent 
decades (1970-2015). We gain the following insights. First, we find that the media mentions of 
both the terms “scandal” and “regulator” exhibit high positive autocorrelation, indicating that 
past mentions in the press are related to future mentions of the same term. The interpretation of 
the log-log model is straightforward. The coefficients on the lagged moving averages of 
SCANDAL_media and REGULATOR_media on the order of 0.82 to 0.93 correspond to 
percentage changes. A one percentage change in past scandals (regulations) translates into a 0.82 
to 0.93 percentage change in future scandals (regulations). Thus, the attention the media pays to 
these two constructs is sticky over time. Second, focusing on the right-hand side of the table, the 
coefficient on lagged scandals is significantly positive in the REGULATOR_media model of 
column (1). The finding suggests that media coverage of scandals serves as an antecedent to 
media coverage about regulation. However, the effect is small with a one percentage change in 
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26  Data for GDP per Capita and Inflation are missing for some of the historical country-years. We linearly 
extrapolate missing years from adjacent observations to fill gaps in the time series. If the gaps are too long (i.e., > 10 
years) or precede the available data, we backfill the missing data by using the annual percentage changes from a 
peer country with high observed correlations in subsequent years. For example, we backfill Germany’s GDP per 
Capita data before 1850 using the U.K.’s growth rates in GDP per capita for the same period. We chose the U.K. 
because the correlation between the two countries is 96 percent over the 1850 to 1880 period. 
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media mentions of “scandal” leading to a 0.03 percentage change in media mentions of 
“regulator.” Third, based on the left-hand side of the table, the coefficient on lagged regulation is 
significantly positive in column (1) of the SCANDAL_media model. Thus, media coverage of 
regulation is followed by higher media coverage of scandals. The effect is highly significant and 
the coefficient magnitude suggests that a one percentage change in media mentions of 
“regulator” leads to a 0.06 percentage change in the mentions of “scandal.” The positive and 
significant coefficient on GDP per Capita indicates a positive impact of economic development 
on the coverage of the two topics by the press. 
The results for the various sub-periods in columns (2), (3), and (4) show that the leading role 
of past media mentions of “scandal” for the future press coverage of “regulation” is present in 
both the first and second half of the sample period, but vanishes in the most recent years after 
1970. This latter sub-period is when the leading role of past media mentions of regulator for 
future scandals is statistically most pronounced. The coefficient is only marginally significant at 
the 12-percent level in the period before World War II. Overall, the analysis of media mentions 
displays many of the expected relations, even though mere press coverage of our broad search 
terms arguably is a coarse and noisy proxy of the underlying constructs. In that sense, we see 
these tests as an independent validity check of our main analyses. 
4.2. ACTUAL EPISODES OF CORPORATE SCANDALS AND REGULATION 
We now turn to the analysis of the lead-lag structure of the actual episodes of corporate 
scandals and regulation that we identified in the comprehensive data collection. Table 6 presents 
results from various specifications of the models in Eq. (1) and (2), using all observations over 
the 1800 to 2015 period. The models differ in terms of the control variables and fixed effects that 
we include, and rank from least restrictive with only country fixed effects in column (1) to most 
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restrictive with controls for economic development, inflation, all sorts of financial crises plus 
country and year fixed effects in column (4). We measure the Financial Crisis variable as a 
binary indicator marking the initial year of a bank crisis, stock market crash, currency crisis, 
inflation crisis, or sovereign debt crisis in a country as indicated in Reinhart and Rogoff [2011]. 
We include a single lag of the three-year backward-looking moving average Financial Crisis 
indicator as a control in the model. Inflation and GDP per Capita are defined as above. We 
estimate the models with logit regression and assess the statistical significance based on robust 
standard errors clustered by country. 
Panel A reports results for all corporate scandals and regulations (suffix _tot). We gain the 
following insights. First, the evolution of corporate scandals and regulation over time follows an 
autoregressive process and is highly persistent. All the coefficients on the lagged terms of the 
dependent variable are positive and highly significant in both the SCANDAL and REGULATION 
model. This finding holds even after controlling for year fixed effects, which flexibly accounts 
for general (global) trends in the data. Second, using REGULATION as the dependent variable, 
lagged scandals help explain future regulatory action as the positive and significant coefficient 
on SCANDAL_tot[t–1 to t–3] indicates. This result even holds in the most restrictive model of 
column (4), albeit only at the 10-percent level of statistical significance. Such a loss of power is 
not surprising because the year fixed effects likely subsume a portion of the treatment effect, 
particularly in times of globalization and international commerce and capital flows. Third, using 
SCANDAL as the dependent variable, lagged regulation possesses explanatory power for future 
corporate misconduct. The coefficient on REGULATION_tot[t–1 to t–3] is significantly positive in 
all four specifications. In terms of the control variables, economic development is positively 
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related to both scandals and regulation in most models; inflation only helps explain regulation; 
controlling for financial crises in a country does not add to the explanatory power.27 
The leading role of corporate scandals for regulation is consistent with the crisis theory. 
Regulators are less flexible and informed than firms and, consequently, are forced to take a 
reactive approach to regulation. The introduction of the 1933/34 U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Acts on the heels of the 1929 Stock Market Crash and the outbreak of the Great Depression, or 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 after the high-profile scandals at Enron, Dynegy, WorldCom, 
and the likes are prominent examples of such reactive behavior. However, on its own, the 
relation does not tell us whether regulation has been effective. It could represent the benevolent 
regulator trying to quickly fix the problem, the captured regulator hiding behind regulatory 
activism, or the ideological regulator imposing an imprint. Past regulation acting as an 
antecedent to future corporate scandals also allows multiple interpretations. This positive 
correlation suggests that regulators are not fully effective (in which case the relation should have 
been negative). Reasons for regulatory ineffectiveness are lack of proper enforcement (e.g., 
Christensen, Hail, and Leuz [2013, 2016]), or the flexibility of firms in directing their 
misbehavior to areas outside the narrow scope of the new regulation.28 Another explanation for 
the positive relation is that only the existence of explicit rules lets the regulator identify corporate 
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27 To explore a potential link between GDP and our two constructs of interest (see also figure 1), we run an 
(unplanned) analysis in which we regress future GDP on its lagged value, past scandals, past regulations, and 
inflation (i.e., a model similar in spirit to Equation 1, but with GDP as the primary variable). In this regression, 
neither past scandals nor regulations exhibit a significant association with future GDP. 
28 Lehman Brothers’ use of so-called Repo 105 transactions in the quarters leading up to its bankruptcy in 2008 is an 
example of staying within the limits of U.S. GAAP, but nonetheless potentially misleading investors. The bank 
repeatedly engaged in short-term repurchase agreements and classified them as sales transactions. It then used the 
sales proceeds to pay down debt to convey the appearance of lower leverage to its investors. The auditor attested to 
Lehman that the transactions were in conformity with GAAP. The recent scandal involving the U.S. bank Wells 
Fargo is another example. The bank’s employees fraudulently opened more than two million customer accounts, but 
management failed to report and auditors did not detect these irregularities even with strong regulations put in place 
under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. The bank argued that the transactions should not be considered “material events” 
for investors (see e.g., Wells Fargo scandal shows the value of regulation, Star Tribune, September 30, 2016). 
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actions as unlawful and in violation of public trust.29 Finally, the positive correlation could 
indicate negative unintended consequences of regulatory action in that the new rules backfire and 
provoke unanticipated management behavior (Merton [1936]). Except for providing anecdotal 
evidence for their existence, unfortunately, our data does not allow us to disentangle the various 
explanations (and they may all be occurring simultaneously). 
Panel B of table 6 reports the results for the same set of regressions while limiting the 
analyses to the pure accounting scandals and accounting regulations (_acctg). The results are 
very similar to panel A, albeit weaker in terms of statistical significance. Both accounting 
scandals and accounting regulation display a positive serial correlation. The leading role of 
scandals for future regulation is only present in the least restrictive model of column (1). The 
leading role of past regulatory activity for future scandals persists across all four models, but 
with lower t-statistics than in panel A. 
Table 7 reports (unplanned) sensitivity analyses for various research design choices. We 
only tabulate the specification that corresponds to Model 2 in table 6, panel A, but the inferences 
extend to the other models as well. First, we output marginal effects of the independent variables 
while holding constant all the other covariates at the mean. This format allows us to interpret the 
coefficients as percentage changes in the underlying probability and to better gauge the 
economic magnitudes.30 Based on column (1) in table 7, past corporate scandals increase the 
probability of future corporate scandals by 31 percent. At the same time, past regulatory action 
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29 An example would be the enactment of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977 after the SEC’s 
investigation of questionable business practices that involved bribing foreign government officials, politicians, and 
political parties (e.g., Lockheed’s bribery of the Japanese prime minister in 1976 or Chiquita Brand’s bribery of the 
president of Honduras in 1974/75 were prominent cases). The FCPA reclassified what used to be “cost of doing 
business” as corporate fraud, and gave the SEC the necessary tools to successfully prosecute this behavior in future 
years. The SEC alone enforced 8 (more than 50) cases within 10 (20) years of the FCPA’s adoption. 
30 Because our primary variables of interest SCANDAL and REGULATION are binary, the interpretation of the 
marginal effects is akin to switching the indicators from zero to one (note that we use 3-year moving averages in the 
regressions). That is, the percentage changes reflect changes from having no scandal or regulation to having at least 
one scandal or regulation in each of the past three years. 
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increases the probability of future scandals by 12 percent. In the regulation model, past scandals 
(regulatory actions) increase the likelihood of future regulation by 6 (13) percent. Second, an 
alternative way of interpreting the coefficients as approximate percentage changes is to estimate 
the models with OLS using the log transformed count (plus one) of scandals and regulations in a 
year as dependent and independent variables. In this model, country-years with many incidents 
receive more weight. As column (2) shows, a one percentage change in the number of scandals is 
related to a 0.46 percentage change in future scandals and a 0.08 percentage change in future 
regulatory action. The same numbers for a one percentage change in past regulations are 0.15 
and 0.21 percentage changes in the number of future scandals and regulations, respectively. 
These estimates are very similar to the marginal effects from the logit regressions. Third, 
imposing country fixed effects might subsume some of the variation in the outcome variables 
and be too demanding for the nature of our data. Thus, we replace the country fixed effects with 
fixed effects for a country’s legal tradition (and also cluster the standard errors by the same unit). 
We distinguish between English common law, French commercial code, German commercial 
code, and Scandinavian civil law countries (La Porta et al. [1998]). Not surprisingly, the 
magnitudes and the statistical significance of the coefficients increase with the less rigid fixed 
effects structure compared to our original specification (see column 3 of table 7). However, the 
inferences remain largely unchanged. Finally, we lag the past scandals and past regulation 
variables by an additional year (i.e., two years instead of one). This specification helps us assess 
the one-year lag structure that we have chosen for our main model (in line with Reinhart and 
Rogoff [2011]). As column (4) shows, the magnitude of the coefficients and the levels of 
statistical significance are only slightly attenuated. We obtain similar and sometimes even 
stronger results when we lag the leading variables by three years (not tabulated). This pattern is 
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consistent with a legislative process that often stretches over multiple years before the new 
regulation is implemented (e.g., Christensen, Hail, and Leuz [2016]). 
In sum, we do find evidence of robust lead-lag relations between corporate scandals and 
regulation in our full sample, and they behave—at least in part—as the public interest view, 
theory of self-interest, or ideological view of regulation would predict. The observed relations 
are in line with the analyses of media mentions in section 4.1, but stronger, consistent with less 
measurement error when focusing on actual episodes of scandals and regulations. We next turn 
to analyzing whether the lead-lag relations differ in the cross-section and over time. 
5. Additional Analyses 
5.1. VARIOUS SUB-PERIODS OVER THE YEARS 1800 TO 2015 
So far, we have documented the general lead-lag structure for the entire 215-year panel of 
historical data. However, the relations presumably do not remain stable over such a long period, 
particularly in light of the stark increase in corporate scandals after the 1970s (see figure 2). 
Thus, we re-estimate the models in Eq. (1) and (2) over various sub-periods, namely the years up 
to and including World War II (1800-1945), the entire post-World War II period (1946-2015), 
and the most recent years comprising the majority of scandals and regulations (1970-2015). We 
present results for these sub-periods together with the overall sample results as benchmarks in 
table 8. The table only reports the coefficient estimates for the main variables of interest, but the 
models include controls for economic development, inflation, and country fixed effects (i.e., 
column 2 in table 6). Panel A reports results for all scandals and regulation (_tot), panel B the 
same for accounting scandals and regulation (_acctg). 
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In panel A, the strong serial correlation in SCANDAL and REGULATION is present before 
and after 1945. The lagged moving averages of the dependent variables are positive and 
significant over both sample halves. We only find evidence of corporate scandals leading 
regulation in the years after World War II. In the period before, the coefficient is smaller in 
magnitude and insignificant. One explanation for the weaker results in earlier years might be the 
reduced public pressure on politicians and regulators during this period when democratically 
elected governments were rare and laws often were introduced as a result of military conflict 
(e.g., the French Commercial Code during the Napoleonic wars) or colonialism (e.g., the British 
imposing U.K.-style laws in colonial India, Canada, and Australia). Other potential explanations 
might be that there was less media coverage of corporate scandals during this period, and/or that 
the less extensive search capabilities available for historic news outlets led to our identification 
of fewer events in the data collection process. The leading role of past regulation for future 
scandals is present both before and after 1945. 
The results for the most recent 46-year period stand out in that none of the SCANDAL and 
REGULATION coefficients are significant. It is during this period that stock markets have 
regained their importance and reached new heights (Rajan and Zingales [2003]). One issue with 
the later years is that scandals and regulation have become so commonplace that their frequency 
in some countries potentially reduces the power of the tests. For instance, during this period we 
only observe 8 years without scandal in Japan, and 6 in the U.K., substantially diminishing how 
the two countries can contribute to the identification of the coefficients. The insignificant results 
are also consistent with regulators becoming more timely in their reaction to events, even though 
we find no signs of increased regulatory effectiveness in recent years, in that future scandals do 
not go down after new regulations. 
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The results for accounting scandals and regulation in panel B are similar, but generally 
weaker. The serial correlation of scandals and regulation persists, but the only significant 
coefficient is the leading role of regulation regarding future scandals before 1945. After 1945, 
the predictive ability of accounting regulation for future scandals disappears. The coefficient on 
accounting scandals leading future regulatory action is never significant. 
5.2. VARIOUS COUNTRY SUB-SAMPLES 
We next compare the lead-lag structure of corporate scandals and regulation across various 
groups of countries. We use fundamental country attributes like economic development, rule of 
law, or legal tradition to form the partitions as these characteristics are likely to evolve only 
slowly over time. Specifically, we split the sample countries into developed versus emerging 
markets based on the classification in the Morgan Stanley Capital International database as of 
2000. We distinguish between countries with strong and weak rule of law based on the index 
scores from La Porta et al. [1998] and split by the sample median. Finally, we run the regressions 
separately for English common law, French commercial code, German commercial code, and 
Scandinavian civil law countries (source: La Porta et al. [1998]). We report coefficients for the 
main variables of interest from estimating our base specification (i.e., column 2 in table 6) in 
table 9. 
The serial correlation in corporate scandals is much more pronounced in emerging markets 
than in developed markets, consistent with fraudulent behavior being more of a problem in these 
economies. On the other hand, the serial correlation in regulation is only present in developed 
markets (but not in emerging markets). This finding suggests that ongoing regulatory activity is, 
among other things, a function of economic development, consistent with the graphical evidence 
in figure 1. Past scandals help explain future regulation in emerging markets, but not in 
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developed economies. The coefficient on the lagged moving average of SCANDAL is more than 
twice the magnitude, and significant only in the emerging market subset when explaining 
regulation. The result points to a more reactive approach by regulators in these countries relative 
to developed markets (maybe because less information is available or these countries cannot 
afford ongoing regulatory action). Regulation being an antecedent to future scandals is present in 
both sets of countries. Thus, regardless of the market structure, regulatory activity does not curb 
corporate misconduct, but rather increases the incidence of future scandals (be it because 
managers are able to avoid the new regulations, regulators have been given the means to detect 
and prosecute scandals, or the regulations spark crises which reveal new scandals). Countries 
with strong rule of law display lead-lag relations very similar to developed markets (or, 
alternatively, weak rule of law countries behave similarly to emerging markets), which is not 
surprising given that the two country attributes are highly correlated.31 
When it comes to a country’s legal tradition, all four groups display a positive serial 
correlation in scandals, while regulation is positively serially correlated in French and German 
commercial code countries. The leading role of scandals for regulation is present throughout 
except for countries with French legal tradition. This evidence could indicate more regulatory 
capture or a less reactive regulatory approach in French commercial code countries. The 
coefficient on the leading role of regulation for future scandals is similar in magnitude across the 
four groups, but not significant in Scandinavian civil law countries. This latter finding might be 
due to lower power, as we only have 444 observations from Scandinavian nations. In sum, we 
find systematic differences across groups of countries, suggesting that the effectiveness of 
regulation is shaped by fundamental characteristics like market development and legal tradition. 
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31 The developed markets of Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the U.K. fall into the group of countries with relatively 
weaker rule of law, while the emerging markets China and Poland do not have an index value for rule of law. 
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5.3. INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES 
In this section, we report results from estimating the lead-lag relation on a country-by-
country basis. Due to the small number of observations, we estimate a reduced form of the 
models in Eq. (1) and (2) that only includes the lagged moving averages of the two dependent 
variables plus an intercept (i.e., no additional control variables and fixed effects). Table 10 
presents the coefficient estimates of these two variables together with the z-statistics (in 
parentheses). In the scandal regression (left-hand side of the table), we report the countries rank 
ordered by the magnitude of the lagged REGULATION coefficient. In the regulation model 
(right-hand side of the table), we report the countries rank ordered by the magnitude of the 
lagged SCANDAL coefficient. We assess the statistical significance based on robust standard 
errors (and also indicate whether the coefficients remain significant after including GDP per 
Capita and Inflation as control variables in the regressions). 
When using SCANDAL as the dependent variable, corporate scandals are serially correlated 
in 21 out of 26 cases. That is, corporate misconduct is highly persistent throughout the world. 
More to the point, regulation is positively correlated with future scandals in 15 of the sample 
countries. The relation is most pronounced in Spain, Israel, Denmark, and Austria. The evidence 
suggests that regulators are not fully effective in these countries. There is only a single country, 
Finland, where the relation is negative (i.e., consistent with regulation reducing corporate 
misconduct under the public interest view), but the coefficient is insignificant. 
In the REGULATION model, a country’s regulatory activity is positively serially correlated 
in only 12 out of 26 cases. In some instances, the coefficient is negative, but never significant. 
Interestingly, whenever past regulatory activity has predictive power for future regulation, 
corporate scandals typically do not, and vice versa. The coefficient on the lagged moving 
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average of scandals is positive and significant in 14 countries, most notably in Israel, Greece, 
South Korea, and India. This finding suggests that in countries where regulatory activity can be 
primarily described as reactive (under the “crisis theory”), a consistent regulatory approach that 
persistently evolves over time is lacking. 
5.4. SPILLOVER EFFECTS ACROSS COUNTRIES 
In the final set of analyses (unplanned), we test for potential spillover effects across 
countries. It is quite plausible that the regulatory activity in one country might affect legislation 
in other countries, be it through military conflict (e.g., during the Napoleonic Wars or after 
World War I and II), by means of colonialization (e.g., across the dominions, colonies, and 
territories of the British Empire that comprised several of the sample countries), or through 
economic ties, bilateral trade, and foreign capital investments.32 Similarly, corporate misconduct 
might spread around the globe. To allow for such cross-country associations between our 
constructs of interest, we expand the base specification (i.e., column 2 in table 6) by adding the 
lagged moving averages of corporate scandals and regulation from another sample country to the 
model. In this way, the time series of current domestic scandals and regulations are modeled as a 
function of both past domestic and foreign scandals and regulations plus controls. We exclude 
the respective foreign country from the sample in this analysis. 
Table 11 reports the results for two foreign countries with a potential impact on domestic 
regulatory activity and corporate misconduct, namely the United Kingdom and France. We chose 
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32 Examples of cross-country spillovers are: the development of Australian financial reporting, which in its early 
years was marked by the influence of British company law like the U.K. Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 or the 
Companies Act of 1862; the wide-ranging historical impact of the French Commercial Code’s bookkeeping 
provisions in Europe; or the internal control portions of Japan’s Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of 2006 
(commonly referred to as J-SOX in line with the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SOX, in the U.S.), which were enacted 
in response to Enron-like corporate scandals in Japan (e.g. Kanebo, Livedoor, and Murakami Fund). Equivalent or 
similar legislation to SOX was also introduced in Canada, Germany, France, Australia, Italy, etc. 
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these two countries because they have had long colonial histories and are at the core of the 
English common law and French commercial code legal traditions. The first two columns report 
the results for spillover effects from the United Kingdom. We note that the relations between 
past and future domestic scandals and regulations remain intact and are all significant at the 5-
percent level or better. However, the coefficient estimates and z-statistics are slightly lower in 
magnitude than in table 6, consistent with the mitigating effects from foreign legislation and 
scandals. More to the point, the influence of the British regime on other sample countries comes 
through in the significantly positive coefficients on the lagged U.K. scandal variable in the 
SCANDAL model and the lagged U.K. regulation term in the REGULATION model. The results 
suggest that regulatory activity (corporate misconduct) in one country has the potential to act as 
an antecedent to future regulations (corporate scandals) in other countries, and that the serial 
correlation in our constructs is not limited to within-country variation, but likely reflects some 
broader, global underlying forces (unless the British multinationals transmitted their domestic 
scandals to the colonies). The coefficients on the foreign variables are about three times smaller 
than the coefficients on the domestic variables. Interestingly, past U.K. regulations also possess 
explanatory power for future corporate scandals in other countries, as indicated by the 
significantly positive coefficient on Foreign_REGULATION_tot[t–1 to t–3] in column (1). Past U.K. 
scandals are not related to future domestic regulatory activity. 
The results for France as a source of cross-country spillover effects are reported in columns 
(3) and (4). They look very similar to the U.K. results. The domestic relations between scandals 
and regulations remain intact while, at the same time, past French scandals and regulations have 
predictive power for future corporate misconduct and regulatory activity in other countries, 
respectively. The coefficient on Foreign_SCANDAL_tot[t–1 to t–3] in column (4) is positive and 
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significant at the 10-percent level, indicating that the time-series of scandals in France is related 
to future regulatory activity in other countries. Past French regulation is not associated with 
future domestic scandals. In sum, we do find initial evidence of cross-country spillover effects in 
our data, but a more comprehensive analysis of these interrelations is needed. 
6. Conclusion 
Can regulators proactively pre-empt corporate wrongdoing before it occurs? And do they 
detect and rectify actual misbehavior in a timely and persistent manner? To answer these 
questions, we develop an extensive historical time series of corporate scandals and regulations 
for 26 countries over the period 1800 to 2015. Our analyses of the lead-lag structure for the large 
panel (at both the global and individual country level) reveal several stylized facts. Both 
regulation and corporate scandals are highly persistent. Regulatory activity has a strong reactive 
component to scandals that have attracted media attention. Regulations do not curb corporate 
misconduct. In fact, today’s regulations predict an increase (rather than decrease) in future 
corporate scandals. Finally, the lead-lag structure between scandals and regulation is changing 
over time and is affected by local institutional factors like market development and a country’s 
legal tradition. Overall, our results cast doubt on the effectiveness of regulation from a public 
interest view. 
The question then becomes why regulation exists in the first place (e.g., McCraw [1984]). 
This issue is even more pressing given the substantial (monetary) resources countries dedicate to 
the promulgation, implementation, and enforcement of regulations. Of course, ideology can 
always serve to justify regulation. Similarly, self-interest and regulatory capture provide strong 
incentives for select parties to design and implement regulations in specific ways. Our study 
focuses on a single benefit of regulation (i.e., the curbing and prevention of corporate 
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misconduct). However, other costs and benefits may exist. For instance, regulation might 
enhance minority investors’ participation in the stock market and, in turn, render capital 
allocation more efficient. One insight from our findings is that there are winners and losers of 
regulation. For instance, the strong positive correlation between past regulation and future 
scandals suggests that regulatory activity does not always achieve its goal, but leads to unwanted 
outcomes. This evidence could be yet another example of what Hayek [1989] called the pretense 
of knowledge in that regulators do not and cannot fully understand the inner workings of a 
complex system, but treat it as if it were following the mechanistic laws of physics. 
Our panel analysis of more than 200 years of rich historical data gives rise to several follow-
up questions. For instance, what are the factors driving the change in the interrelation between 
scandals and regulation over time and across countries, as our empirical evidence suggests? How 
does transitioning from a non-democratic to a democratic regime or vice versa affect this 
change? How do regulations and corporate scandals spread over time and across nations? In 
countries where we show that regulators behave reactively, what types of scandals prompt them 
to implement and enforce new regulation, and how long does it take? In countries where we 
show evidence of a leading role of regulation, disentangling the explanations for the future 
occurrence of scandals is crucial. Are these scandals a direct violation of existing regulations or 
are firm managers able to creatively circumvent the new rules? Our dataset offers ample 
opportunity for inquiry. Moreover, future researchers can refine the existing data collection, add 
more countries and/or time periods, and complement the scandal and regulation data with other 
relevant variables, similar in spirit to the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample from Murdock and 
White [1969] (see also Basu, Kirk, and Waymire [2009] for an application in accounting). We 
leave issues like these for future research. 
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FIG. 1.—The figure plots the yearly number of times the terms “scandal” and “regulator” are mentioned in the local 
business press over the 1800 to 2015 period. The sample comprises 24 (out of 26) countries, for which we have 
electronically accessible and searchable newspaper archives available. We have no data for Portugal and Egypt. In 
each country, we search the historical archives of a leading (business) newspaper for the occurrence of the above 
two terms (or the local equivalents), and aggregate these numbers on a yearly basis (see the appendix for details and 
individual country graphs). We report the contemporaneous Pearson correlation coefficients between the two 
time-series over the entire period as well as over various sub-periods. The graph also plots the median GDP per 
capita of the sample countries over time (dotted line; measured in 1990 International Dollars; source: The 
Maddison-Project, 2013 version). We further indicate periods of global financial crises (shaded in grey), and defined 
as years in which more than two-thirds of the sample countries experienced at least one crisis of the following type: 
bank crisis, stock market crash, currency crisis, inflation crisis, or sovereign debt crisis. The financial crises 
definitions and data are from Reinhart and Rogoff [2011]. 
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FIG. 2.—The figure plots the yearly number of total corporate scandals and total regulation (panel A) or accounting 
scandals and accounting regulation (panel B) for our sample of 26 countries over the 1800 to 2015 period. Total 
scandals comprise accounting scandals, near accounting scandals, and other scandals. Total regulations comprise 
accounting regulations, other regulations, and supranational regulations. See section 2 for details. If feasible, we 
measure corporate scandals in the year they are first covered in the financial press, and regulation in the year it is 
enacted. We report the contemporaneous Pearson correlation coefficients between the two time-series over the entire 
period as well as over various sub-periods. We further indicate periods of global corporate (accounting) scandals 
(shaded in grey), and defined as years in which more than half of the sample countries experienced at least one 
corporate (accounting) scandal. 
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FIG. 3.—The figure plots the yearly number of total corporate scandals and regulation for the United Kingdom over 
the period 1800 to 2015 (shaded bars; axis on the left). The figure also plots the yearly number of times the terms 
“scandal” (solid line) and “regulator” (dashed line; axis on the right) are mentioned in the U.K. newspaper Financial 
Times (beginning in 1888). We exclude the period of World War II (1940 to 1945) from the analyses because the 
mentions of the two search terms in the media drop close to zero during these years. We report the contemporaneous 
Pearson correlation coefficients between the two time-series of media mentions over the entire period as well as over 
various sub-periods. 
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FIG. 4.—The figure plots the yearly number of total corporate scandals and regulation for the United States over the 
period 1851 to 2015 (shaded bars; axis on the left). The figure also plots the yearly number of times the terms 
“scandal” (solid line) and “regulator” (dashed line; axis on the right) are mentioned in the U.S. newspaper The New 
York Times. We report the contemporaneous Pearson correlation coefficients between the two time-series of media 
mentions over the entire period as well as over various sub-periods. 
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FIG. 5.—The figure plots the yearly number of total corporate scandals and regulation for China over the period 
1878 to 2015 (shaded bars; axis on the left). The figure also plots the yearly number of times the terms “scandal” 
(solid line) and “regulator” (dashed line; axis on the right) are mentioned in the Chinese newspapers Shen Bao (i.e., 
Shanghai News; 1878 to1948) and People’s Daily (1949 to 2015). We use the terms “scandal” (“??” or “??”) 
and “fraud” (“??”, “??” or “??”, and “??” or “??”) together with “supervising authority” (“???” or 
“????”, “???” or “????”, and “???” or “????”) and “company law” (“???”, “????” 
or “????”, and “???”) in the media search. We report the contemporaneous Pearson correlation coefficients 
between the two time-series of media mentions over the entire period as well as over various sub-periods. 
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FIG. 6.—The figure plots the yearly number of total corporate scandals and regulation for Italy over the period 1860 
to 2015 (shaded bars; axis on the left). The figure also plots the yearly number of times the terms “scandal” (solid 
line) and “regulator” (dashed line; axis on the right) are mentioned in the Italian newspaper La Stampa (beginning in 
1867). We use the terms “scandal” (“scandalo”) and “regulator” (“regolatore” and “legislatore”) in the media search. 
We retain the years during World War II (1940 to 1945) for the analysis even though the search produces lower 
levels of newspaper hits, but the numbers remain comparable to adjacent years and far above zero. We report the 
contemporaneous Pearson correlation coefficients between the two time-series of media mentions over the entire 
period as well as over various sub-periods. 
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TABLE 1 
Data Sources and Data Availability for Newspaper Search by Country 
Country Earliest  
Year 
Premier (Business) Outlets/Other Outlets 
(Period Covered and Available Archives) 
Australia 1831 -! Sydney Morning Herald (until 1841: Sydney Herald; 1831 to 2015); online archive through 
Trove from the National Library of Australia (E); online newspaper archive ($; E); and online 
archive through Fairfax Media News Store (E). 
-! Australian Financial Review* (1987 to 2015); online archive through Factiva ($; E). 
Austria 1800 -! Wiener Zeitung* (1800 to 1847; 1908 to 1913; 1919 to 1932); online archive through 
university library (E). 
-! Die Presse*/Neue Freie Presse (1848 to 1939; 2001 to 2015); online archive through university 
library (E), and online newspaper archive ($; E). 
-! Austria Press Agency APA (1955 to 2015); online archive of provider ($; E). 
Belgium 1831 -! L’Indépendance Belge (1831 to 1940); digital archive with onsite access at Royal Belgian 
Library (E). 
-! Het Laatste Nieuws (1941 to 1950); digital archive with onsite access at Royal Belgian Library 
(E). 
-! Het Belang van Limburg (1951 to 1987); digital archive with onsite access at the editorial office 
of the newspaper (E). 
-! De Tijd* (1988 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
Brazil 1875 -! O Estado de São Paulo (1875 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
-! Folha de São Paulo (1921 to 2015); online newspaper archive (E). 
-! Valor Econômico* (1996 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
Canada 1844 -! The Globe and Mail (until 1936: The Globe; 1844 to 2015); online archive through ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers ($; E). 
China 1878 -! Shen Bao (??, 1878 to 1949); online archive through university library (E). 
-! People’s Daily (????, 1949 to 2015): online archive through university library (E) and 
Factiva ($; E). 
-! 21st Century Business Herald* (21??????, 2001 to 2015); online archive through 
WiseSearch ($; E). 
Denmark 1884 -! Politiken (1884 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
-! Dagbladet Børsen* (1970 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
-! Berlingske Business* (1980 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
-! Finans.dk (1996 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
Egypt 1888 -! The Egyptian Gazette (1888 to 1966); onsite access to newspaper microfilms at the Center for 
Research Libraries and various university libraries (M). 
-! La Bourse Égyptienne* (1929-1963); onsite access to newspaper microfilms at the Center for 
Research Libraries (M). 
-! Al Ahram Weekly (1998 to 2015); online newspaper archive (E). 
-! Daily News Egypt (2008 to 2015); online archive through Lexis Nexis ($, E). 
Finland 1889 -! Helsingin Sanomat* (1889 to 2015); national library digital collections (E); onsite access to 
digital collection of the Päivälehti Archives (E); and online newspaper archive ($; E). 
France 1826 -! Le Figaro (1826 to 1942); online archive through French National Library (E). 
-! Journal des Finances* (1870 to 1938); online archive through French National Library (E). 
-! Le Monde* (1945 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
-! Les Échos* (1997 to 2015); online archive through Factiva ($; E). 
Germany 1805 -! Hamburger Börsen-Halle (1805 to 1866); online archive through university library (E). 
-! Berliner Börsen-Zeitung (1872 to 1930); online archive through university library (E). 
-! Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (1949 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
Greece 1830 -! Empros (1896 to 1930; 1945 to 1966); online archive through university library (E). 
-! Other newspaper sources used: Eleftheria (E; 1945 to 1966); Aion (M; 1838 to 1891); Acropolis 
(M; 1883 to 1935); To Asty (M; 1885 to 1907); various (M; 1830 to 1936); online access to 
newspaper microfilms through the library of the Greek Parliament. 
-! Naftemporiki* (1996 to 2015); online newspaper archive (E, $). 
India 1838 -! The Times of India (1838 to 2015); online archive through ProQuest Historical Newspapers 
and NewsBank ($; E). 
-! Financial Times* (1888 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
Israel 1932 -! The Jerusalem Post (until 1950: The Palestine Post; 1932 to 2015); online archive through 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers and Lexis Nexis ($; E). 
Italy 1860 -! La Stampa* (1867 to 2015); online newspaper archive (E). 
-! Il Corriere della Sera (1876 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
-! Il Sole 24 Ore (1920 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
(Continued) 
TABLE 1—Continued 
Country Earliest  
Year 
Premier (Business) Outlets/Other Outlets 
(Period Covered and Available Archives) 
Japan 1874 -! Yomiuri Shimbun (????; 1874 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
-! The Nikkei* (??????; 1975 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
Korea (South) 1920 -! Cho-sun Il-Bo (1920 to 2015); online archive through university library (E). 
Netherlands 1828 -! Algemeen Handelsblad* (from 1970 on: NRC Handelsblad*) (1828 to 1994; 1998 to 2015); 
online archive through Delpher (E); and online archive through Lexis Nexis ($; E). 
Poland 1920 -! Gazeta Wyborcza* (1989 to 2015); online archive through university library (E). 
-! Kurier Warszawski (1920 to 1938, missing 1921 and 1927); online archive through university 
library (M). 
Portugal 1864 -! Diário de Notícias (1864 to 1918; 1974 to 2015): onsite access to newspaper microfilms at 
National Library of Portugal (M); and online archive through Factiva ($; E). 
-! Diário de Notícias, Portuguese-American edition (1919 to 1973); online archive through library 
(E). 
South Africa 1880 -! The Rand Daily Mail (1905 to 1910; 1940 to 1985); online archive through NewsBank ($; E). 
-! Other newspaper sources used: The Journal (1880 to 1913); Natal Witness (1880 to 1885); 
Friend of the Free State and Bloemfontein Gazette (1880 to 1890); Indian Opinion (1903 to 
1922); various (1880 to 1939); online archive through NewsBank ($, E). 
-! Business Day* (1986 to 2015): onsite access to newspaper microfilms at Northwestern 
University (M); and online archive through NewsBank ($; E). 
Spain 1881 -! La Vanguardia (1881 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
-! Cinco Días* (1978 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
Sweden 1831 -! Svenska Dagbladet (1884 to 2015); online archive through national library of Sweden (E). 
-! Aftonbladet (1831 to 2015); online archive through national library of Sweden (E). 
-! Dagens Industri* (1976 to 2015); online archive through national library of Sweden (E). 
Switzerland 1800 -! Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (1800 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
United 
Kingdom 
1800 -! Financial Times* (1888 to 2015); online newspaper archive ($; E). 
United States 1851 -! The New York Times (1851 to 2015); online archive through ProQuest Historical Newspapers 
($; E). 
-! The Wall Street Journal* (1889 to 2015); online archive through ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers ($; E). 
 
The table reports the premier (national) newspaper outlet (in bold) together with additional newspaper sources that 
we used for our electronic and manual search of corporate scandals in a country. We also report the earliest year for 
which newspaper sources are available. An asterisk (*) indicates a newspaper with a strong business focus/section; a 
dollar sign ($) indicates that the electronic archive does not offer free access, but needs a subscription; E stands for 
electronic archive that is accessible through key word search; M stands for archive that requires manual search (e.g., 
microfilm or hardcopies). 
 
TABLE 2 
Examples of Classification of Corporate Scandals from the United Kingdom 
 
Year 
Event 
(Classification) 
Classification Criteria 
(1) 
Does the event involve one  
or more financial reporting 
practices? 
(2) 
Are these practices either 
morally or legally wrong 
under local customs or 
jurisdiction? 
(3) 
Does the event trigger 
material (negative) 
consequences for  
corporate outsiders? 
(4) 
Does the event cause a  
public outcry and discussion? 
1845 
2nd Railway Mania 
(Accounting Scandal) 
-! Inflated sales 
-! Capitalized costs 
-! Accounting fraud 
-! Bribery of politicians 
-! Insider trading 
-! Bankruptcy 
-! Many middle class 
families lost their entire 
savings 
-! Extensive coverage in The London Times and 
The Economist 
1878 
City of Glasgow 
Bank 
(Accounting Scandal) 
-! Fictitious accounting entries to 
overstate assets and understate 
liabilities 
-! Overvaluation of irrecoverable 
banking assets and other 
investments 
-! Purchases of the bank’s shares to 
maintain its market valuation 
-! Accounting fraud 
-! Directors were convicted 
and sentenced to prison 
-! Bank collapsed 
-! Deficiency of capital 
estimated at £5.19 
million 
-! Hundreds of firms folded 
as a result and the 1,200 
shareholders and their 
families suffered greatly 
-! Extensive coverage in international media 
outlets (The London Times; New York Times) 
-! The failure resulted in greater publicity “than 
had ever previously fallen to the lot of any 
business establishment” and was seen as “an 
event which would long be remembered by 
thousands in Scotland as the saddest and 
darkest in their history.” 
1965 
Fire, Auto & Marine 
Insurance 
(Near Accounting 
Scandal) 
-! Reporting of non-existent 
investments 
-! Insufficient cash flows 
-! Insurance fraud 
-! Emil Savundra (founder) 
was convicted of fraud 
-! Left 400,000 previously 
insured motorists without 
insurance coverage 
-! Emil Savundra’s lavish lifestyle drew 
attention of the U.K. media, which uncovered 
the evidence of a major fraud 
1986 
The Guinness Affair 
(Near Accounting 
Scandal) 
-! False accounting (minor effects) 
-! The CEO’s arrangement to 
purchase Guinness shares had 
not been revealed to the board. 
The CEO was said to have 
misreported this sum in 
Guinness's financial accounts. 
-! Inflation of Guinness 
share price to assist 
takeover bid for Distillers 
-! Four businessmen were 
charged and convicted of 
criminal offences for price 
manipulation. 
-! After takeover of 
Distillers, Guinness share 
price tripled 
-! Payment of large fees and 
other awards to parties 
involved in the scheme 
-! Front page coverage in international media 
outlets (Financial Times; Wall Street Journal) 
1998 
GLH Derivatives 
and Griffin Trading 
Company 
(Other Scandal) 
-! n.a. -! Firms went into default 
after a single trader lost 
£6.2 million (10 times 
exceeding his trading 
limit) on German 
derivative investments 
-! First default in the 
industry since collapse of 
Barings in 1995 
-! Forced closure by the 
regulator 
-! Extensive coverage in international media 
outlets (BBC; The Independent; Wall Street 
Journal) 
 
2007 
Northern Rock 
(Other Scandal) 
-! n.a. -! Financial distress due to 
investments in U.S. 
sub-prime mortgage debt 
-! Bank collapsed and was 
later nationalized 
-! Bank run 
-! First U.K. bank run since Overend, Gurney & 
Co. in 1866 (also in our sample) 
-! Front-page coverage in international media 
outlets (Financial Times, Wall Street Journal) 
 
The table provides illustrative examples of corporate scandals in the U.K. that we identified in our data collection, and describes how we classify them as either 
“accounting scandal”, “near accounting scandal”, or “other scandal” for the empirical analyses based on the four criteria outlined in section 2.2.2. 
TABLE 3 
Sample Composition and Description by Country and Decade 
Panel A: Number of observations, and incidents of corporate scandals and regulation by country 
     Corporate Scandals  Regulation 
Country Legal Tradition 
Earliest 
Year 
Country- 
Years  
Account- 
ing 
Near 
Accounting Other Total  
Account- 
ing Other 
Supra- 
national Total 
Australia English 1831 185  38 19 31 88  17 14 0 31 
Austria German 1800 201  20 6 18 44  12 12 8 32 
Belgium French 1831 179  10 12 26 48  22 14 8 44 
Brazil French 1875 141  14 8 16 38  29 5 0 34 
Canada English 1844 172  20 13 44 77  35 8 0 43 
China – 1878 138  69 26 32 127  32 28 0 60 
Denmark Scand. 1884 132  15 26 11 52  19 5 5 29 
Egypt French 1888 121  8 11 31 50  16 21 0 37 
Finland Scand. 1889 127  3 6 7 16  9 11 3 23 
France French 1826 184  48 35 48 131  34 15 8 57 
Germany German 1805 204  64 7 15 86  23 16 11 50 
Greece French 1830 169  4 14 14 32  18 14 8 40 
India English 1838 178  15 14 20 49  14 14 0 28 
Israel English 1932 84  1 6 8 15  26 15 0 41 
Italy French 1860 156  73 57 31 161  27 24 12 63 
Japan German 1874 142  127 35 65 227  40 19 0 59 
Korea (South) German 1920 91  25 17 32 74  23 27 1 51 
Netherlands French 1828 183  22 10 15 47  14 22 6 42 
Poland – 1920 89  19 15 40 74  11 5 3 19 
Portugal French 1864 152  11 21 29 61  34 3 5 42 
South Africa English 1880 136  26 19 52 97  26 14 0 40 
Spain French 1881 131  20 19 23 62  20 16 6 42 
Sweden Scand. 1831 185  30 18 35 83  17 13 4 34 
Switzerland German 1800 216  17 10 26 53  26 10 0 36 
United Kingdom English 1800 210  92 54 76 222  34 16 6 56 
United States English 1851 165  97 46 87 230  35 13 0 48 
Total   4,071  888 524 832 2,244  613 374 94 1,081 
(Continued) 
TABLE 3—Continued 
Panel B: Number of observations, and incidents of corporate scandals and regulation by decade 
     Corporate Scandals  Regulation 
Decade  Number of Countries 
Country- 
Years  
Account- 
ing 
Near 
Accounting Other Total  
Account- 
ing Other 
Supra- 
national Total 
1800  4 35  0 0 0 0  1 0 1 2 
1810  4 40  0 0 1 1  1 1 0 2 
1820  6 46  0 0 2 2  0 0 0 0 
1830  11 99  0 2 1 3  4 4 0 8 
1840  12 116  2 2 11 15  7 2 0 9 
1850  13 129  7 5 11 23  9 7 0 16 
1860  15 146  9 5 12 26  12 7 0 19 
1870  18 163  7 10 16 33  12 4 0 16 
1880  23 208  10 15 28 53  14 9 0 23 
1890  23 230  28 15 33 76  15 15 0 30 
1900  23 230  37 23 19 79  19 10 0 29 
1910  23 230  13 22 24 59  21 13 0 34 
1920  25 250  24 21 42 87  23 11 0 34 
1930  26 248  30 27 50 107  37 11 1 49 
1940  25 205  4 7 12 23  27 15 0 42 
1950  26 255  15 21 29 65  28 20 0 48 
1960  26 254  35 13 21 69  32 10 1 43 
1970  26 251  62 31 45 138  60 23 0 83 
1980  26 260  57 50 74 181  59 25 16 100 
1990  26 260  158 103 146 407  85 71 11 167 
2000  26 260  264 101 167 532  117 83 50 250 
2010  26 156  126 51 88 265  30 33 14 77 
Total   4,071  888 524 832 2,244  613 374 94 1,081 
 
The sample comprises the 12 countries with substantive accounting scandals in the past as identified in Jones [2011], the next 11 largest (in terms of GDP) 
OECD countries (we were unable to collect data for Mexico, Norway, and Turkey) plus Brazil, Egypt, and South Africa. It covers the years 1800 to 2015. This 
selection procedure yields a global sample of 26 countries spanning Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America, and Oceania for a period of more 
than 200 years. The table reports the beginning of the sample period, the number of country-years, and the number of corporate scandals and regulations by 
country (panel A) and decade (panel B). For the empirical analyses, we classify the corporate scandals that we identified in the data collection as either 
“accounting scandal”, “near accounting scandal”, or “other scandal” based on the four criteria outlined in section 2.2.2 (see also table 2). We classify the 
regulatory actions that we identified as either “accounting regulation”, “other regulation”, or “supranational regulation” based on how they affect a firm’s 
financial reporting and whether they were drafted and decided upon at the national or supranational level. We measure corporate scandals in the year they are 
first covered in the financial press and media, and regulation in the year it is enacted. In panel A, we also indicate a country’s legal tradition (source: La Porta 
et al. [1998]), and distinguish between English common law, French commercial code, German commercial code, and Scandinavian civil law countries. 
TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Regression Analyses 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
Media Mentions:         
  SCANDAL_media 3,241 391.0 663.6 0 45 157 444 3,329 
  REGULATOR_media 3,241 404.9 691.5 0 25 113 463 3,863 
Corporate Scandals:         
  SCANDAL_acctg 4,071 0.134 0.341      
  SCANDAL_acctg+near 4,071 0.201 0.401      
  SCANDAL_tot 4,071 0.291 0.454      
Regulation:         
  REGULATION_acctg 4,071 0.134 0.340      
  REGULATION_acctg+oth 4,071 0.195 0.396      
  REGULATION_tot 4,071 0.206 0.404      
Control Variables:         
  GDP per Capita 4,048 6,159 6,588 507.4 1,624 3,162 8,306 25,256 
  Inflation 4,045 13.47 146.40 -19.94 0 2.68 7.51 114.20 
  Financial Crisis 3,987 0.106 0.308      
 
The sample comprises up to 4,071 country-year observations from 26 countries over the 1800 to 2015 period (see table 3). The table presents descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in the regression analyses. For the analysis of media mentions, we count the yearly number of times the terms “scandal” 
(SCANDAL_media) and “regulator” (REGULATOR_media) or the local equivalents are mentioned in the local (business) press. For the analysis of corporate 
scandals, we define the following binary indicators: We code the variable SCANDAL as ‘1’ if there is a corporate scandal discovered in the financial press or 
media in a country and year, and ‘0’ otherwise. We distinguish between pure accounting scandals (_acctg), accounting scandals plus near accounting scandals 
(_acctg+near), and all corporate scandals (_tot) when coding the SCANDAL variable (as indicated by the suffix). We code the variable REGULATION as ‘1’ if 
there is a new or substantially amended regulation enacted in a country and year, and ‘0’ otherwise. We distinguish between accounting regulation (_acctg), 
accounting and other regulatory activities (_acctg+oth), and all regulatory activities including supranational legislations (_tot) when coding the REGULATION 
variable (as indicated by the suffix). For details on the different categories, see section 2.2.2. In some specifications, we include controls for yearly GDP per 
Capita (measured in 1990 International Dollars; source: The Maddison-Project: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 2013 version), 
and the annual percentage change in consumer price indices, Inflation (source: the online resources to Reinhart and Rogoff [2011]). Financial Crisis is a binary 
indicator marking the initial year of a bank crisis, stock market crash, currency crisis, inflation crisis, or sovereign debt crisis in a country. The financial crises 
definitions and data are from Reinhart and Rogoff [2011]. 
TABLE 5 
Temporal Patterns of Media Mentions of the Terms “Scandal” and “Regulator” over the 1800 to 2015 Period 
 ln(1 + SCANDAL_mediat) as Dependent Variable  ln(1 + REGULATOR_mediat) as Dependent Variable 
 (1) 
1800-2015 
(2) 
1800-1945 
(3) 
1946-2015 
(4) 
1970-2015 
 (1) 
1800-2015 
(2) 
1800-1945 
(3) 
1946-2015 
(4) 
1970-2015 
Lagged Scandals and Regulation:          
 ln(1 + SCANDAL_media[t–1 to t–3]) 0.875*** 0.824*** 0.871*** 0.847***  0.031* 0.042* 0.028* 0.024 
 (43.65) (17.76) (32.31) (24.87)  (1.72) (1.86) (1.73) (0.95) 
 ln(1 + REGULATOR_media[t–1 to t–3]) 0.062*** 0.068 0.034* 0.045***  0.932*** 0.828*** 0.906*** 0.908*** 
 (3.30) (1.61) (2.00) (3.06)  (52.67) (28.24) (34.13) (40.66) 
Control Variables:          
 ln(GDP per Capitat–1) 0.080*** 0.034 0.086** -0.003  0.074*** 0.097** 0.111** 0.070 
 (4.03) (0.58) (2.52) (-0.04)  (2.88) (2.15) (2.12) (0.99) 
 ln(Inflationt–1) -0.044 -0.172** -0.025 -0.056**  0.020 0.022 0.044 0.002 
 (-0.97) (-2.40) (-0.45) (-2.14)  (0.56) (0.24) (0.94) (0.05) 
Fixed Effects Country Country Country Country  Country Country Country Country 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.923 0.886 0.930 0.914  0.942 0.920 0.949 0.942 
Observations 3,224 1,646 1,578 1,043  3,224 1,646 1,578 1,043 
 
The table reports analyses of the lead-lag relation between scandals (of any kind) and regulations (of any kind) based on media mentions. The sample 
comprises up to 3,224 country-year observations from 24 countries over the 1800 to 2015 period (see table 3). The dependent variables are the numbers of 
times the terms “scandal” and “regulator” (or the local equivalents) are mentioned in the local (business) press in a year, SCANDAL_media and 
REGULATOR_media, respectively. The independent variables are: (i) the three-year backward-looking moving averages of the two dependent variables, (ii) 
GDP per Capita, and (iii) annual Inflation. We use the natural log of the raw values (plus one or, for inflation, plus the minimum sample inflation rate) as 
indicated, and lag all independent variables by one year. The table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics 
based on robust standard errors clustered by country. We include country fixed effects in the regressions, but do not report the coefficients. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
TABLE 6 
Temporal Patterns of Corporate Scandals and Regulation over the 1800 to 2015 Period 
Panel A: Logit regression analysis of total corporate scandals and total regulation 
 SCANDAL_tott as Dependent Variable  REGULATION_tott as Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged Scandals and Regulation:          
 SCANDAL_tot[t–1 to t–3] 2.539*** 1.726*** 1.748*** 1.467***  1.170*** 0.426*** 0.421*** 0.296* 
 (13.58) (6.97) (7.06) (5.25)  (7.50) (3.07) (3.04) (1.70) 
 REGULATION_tot[t–1 to t–3] 1.416*** 0.656*** 0.651*** 0.572***  1.521*** 0.918*** 0.970*** 0.879*** 
 (9.50) (4.41) (4.31) (2.95)  (8.40) (3.90) (4.27) (4.02) 
Control Variables:          
 ln(GDP per Capitat–1) – 0.773*** 0.770*** 0.804**  – 0.615*** 0.602*** 0.084 
  (8.79) (8.78) (2.39)   (5.08) (5.08) (0.24) 
 ln(Inflationt–1) – -0.101 -0.092 0.112  – 0.316*** 0.324*** 0.260** 
  (-0.49) (-0.44) (0.49)   (3.42) (3.39) (2.22) 
 Financial Crisis[t–1 to t–3] – – -0.106 -0.151  – – 0.177 0.036 
   (-0.60) (-0.65)    (0.58) (0.12) 
Fixed Effects C C C C, Y  C C C C, Y 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.223 0.257 0.259 0.295  0.089 0.118 0.115 0.152 
Observations 4,071 4,038 3,970 3,702  4,071 4,038 3,970 3,651 
 
Panel B: Logit regression analysis of accounting scandals and accounting regulation 
 SCANDAL_acctgt as Dependent Variable  REGULATION_acctgt as Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged Scandals and Regulation:          
 SCANDAL_acctg[t–1 to t–3] 3.218*** 1.604*** 1.613*** 1.185***  1.058*** 0.080 0.080 -0.044 
 (14.51) (6.77) (6.75) (4.14)  (5.93) (0.37) (0.36) (-0.26) 
 REGULATION_acctg[t–1 to t–3] 1.415*** 0.653*** 0.629** 0.537*  1.511*** 0.942*** 0.947*** 0.901*** 
 (5.74) (2.61) (2.43) (1.72)  (7.79) (4.60) (4.45) (4.95) 
Control Variables:          
 ln(GDP per Capitat–1) – 1.050*** 1.046*** 1.290***  – 0.583*** 0.577*** 0.190 
  (10.39) (10.43) (4.65)   (4.84) (4.80) (0.48) 
 ln(Inflationt–1) – -0.440* -0.437* -0.073  – 0.176 0.208** 0.186* 
  (-1.68) (-1.65) (-0.44)   (1.63) (2.01) (1.66) 
 Financial Crisis[t–1 to t–3] – – 0.184 0.092  – – 0.206 -0.086 
   (0.52) (0.26)    (0.71) (-0.26) 
Fixed Effects C C C C, Y  C C C C, Y 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.222 0.281 0.279 0.281  0.062 0.088 0.085 0.113 
Observations 4,071 4,038 3,970 2,963  4,071 4,038 3,970 3,406 
(Continued) 
TABLE 6—Continued 
The table reports analyses of the lead-lag relation between corporate scandals and regulation based on our comprehensive data collection for 26 countries over 
the 1800 to 2015 period (see table 3). The dependent variables are binary indicators marking the incidents of corporate scandals (SCANDAL) and the enactment 
of regulation (REGULATION) in a country and year. For the analyses, we combine all corporate scandals with all regulatory activities including supranational 
legislations in panel A (as indicated by the suffix _tot), and pure accounting scandals with accounting regulation in panel B (_acctg). Depending on the 
specification, we include the following independent variables in the model: (i) the three-year backward-looking moving averages of the two dependent 
variables, (ii) GDP per Capita, (iii) annual Inflation, and (iv) the three-year backward-looking moving average of an indicator marking the initial year of a 
Financial Crisis in a country. See table 4 for details. We lag all independent variables by one year, and use the natural log of the raw values (plus one or, for 
inflation, plus the minimum sample inflation rate) if indicated. The table reports logit coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) z-statistics based on robust 
standard errors clustered by country. We include country (C) and year (Y) fixed effects in the regressions, but do not report the coefficients. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
TABLE 7 
Sensitivity Analyses for Main Specification 
 SCANDAL_tott as Dependent Variable  REGULATION_tott as Dependent Variable 
 (1) 
Marginal 
Effects 
(Logit) 
(2) 
OLS 
Regression 
Analysis 
(3) 
Legal Tradi- 
tion Fixed  
Effects 
(4) 
Additional 
Lag of 
Predictors 
 
(1) 
Marginal 
Effects 
(Logit) 
(2) 
OLS 
Regression 
Analysis 
(3) 
Legal Tradi- 
tion Fixed  
Effects 
(4) 
Additional 
Lag of 
Predictors 
Lagged Scandals and Regulation:          
 SCANDAL_tot[t–1 to t–3] 0.313*** 0.458*** 2.376*** 1.351***  0.062*** 0.079*** 0.644*** 0.422*** 
 (7.17) (10.87) (15.88) (5.45)  (3.05) (3.64) (4.15) (3.47) 
 REGULATION_tot[t–1 to t–3] 0.119*** 0.147*** 0.851*** 0.751***  0.133*** 0.214*** 1.313*** 0.963*** 
 (4.44) (3.65) (5.23) (4.57)  (3.77) (5.65) (5.87) (3.60) 
Control Variables:          
 ln(GDP per Capitat–1) 0.140*** 0.108*** 0.462*** 0.835***  0.089*** 0.073*** 0.379*** 0.612*** 
 (9.30) (8.37) (8.88) (8.53)  (5.56) (5.53) (3.19) (5.32) 
 ln(Inflationt–1) -0.018 -0.025 -0.051 -0.112  0.046*** 0.023* 0.396*** 0.326*** 
 (-0.49) (-1.55) (-0.24) (-0.51)  (3.34) (2.05) (6.99) (3.32) 
Fixed Effects C C LT C  C C LT C 
Pseudo (Adjusted) R-Squared 0.257 0.399 0.229 0.246  0.118 0.153 0.099 0.119 
 
The table reports sensitivity analyses of the lead-lag relation between corporate scandals and regulation for 4,038 observations from 26 countries over the 1800 
to 2015 period (see table 3). The dependent variables are binary indicators marking all incidents of corporate scandals (SCANDAL_tot), and the enactment of 
all regulatory activities (REGULATION_tot) in a country and year. We run the following variations of model 2 in table 6, panel A: (1) We estimate the 
marginal effects of the independent variables while holding all the other covariates at the respective means. (2) We estimate the model using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression instead of logit. (3) We replace the country fixed effects (C) with fixed effects for a country’s legal tradition (LT). (4) We lag the 
three-year backward-looking moving averages of SCANDAL_tot and REGULATION_tot by two years instead of one. The table reports logit (OLS) coefficient 
estimates and (in parentheses) z-statistics (t-statistics) based on robust standard errors clustered by country (a country’s legal tradition). ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
TABLE 8 
Analysis of Various Sub-Periods over the 1800 to 2015 Time Frame 
Panel A: Logit regression analysis of total corporate scandals and total regulation 
 SCANDAL_tott as Dependent Variable  REGULATION_tott as Dependent Variable 
 (1) 
1800-2015 
(2) 
1800-1945 
(3) 
1946-2015 
(4) 
1970-2015 
 (1) 
1800-2015 
(2) 
1800-1945 
(3) 
1946-2015 
(4) 
1970-2015 
Lagged Scandals and Regulation:          
 SCANDAL_tot[t–1 to t–3] 1.726*** 1.373*** 1.252*** 0.582*  0.426*** 0.186 0.531** 0.175 
 (6.97) (3.98) (4.51) (1.66)  (3.07) (0.75) (2.26) (0.67) 
 REGULATION_tot[t–1 to t–3] 0.656*** 0.565** 0.671** 0.105  0.918*** 0.900*** 0.512** -0.063 
 (4.41) (2.41) (2.29) (0.36)  (3.90) (3.68) (2.17) (-0.30) 
Control Variables & Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.257 0.194 0.268 0.227  0.118 0.053 0.089 0.066 
Observations 4,038 2,224 1,793 1,187  4,038 2,224 1,793 1,187 
 
Panel B: Logit regression analysis of accounting scandals and accounting regulation 
 SCANDAL_acctgt as Dependent Variable  REGULATION_acctgt as Dependent Variable 
 (1) 
1800-2015 
(2) 
1800-1945 
(3) 
1946-2015 
(4) 
1970-2015 
 (1) 
1800-2015 
(2) 
1800-1945 
(3) 
1946-2015 
(4) 
1970-2015 
Lagged Scandals and Regulation:          
 SCANDAL_acctg[t–1 to t–3] 1.604*** 1.405** 0.973*** 0.665**  0.080 0.477 0.150 0.254 
 (6.77) (2.24) (3.55) (2.13)  (0.37) (0.97) (0.46) (0.75) 
 REGULATION_acctg[t–1 to t–3] 0.653*** 0.930** 0.482 0.242  0.942*** 0.679** 0.630*** 0.110 
 (2.61) (2.05) (1.08) (0.68)  (4.60) (2.01) (2.69) (0.45) 
Control Variables & Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.281 0.153 0.292 0.244  0.088 0.068 0.063 0.057 
Observations 4,038 2,096 1,793 1,187  4,038 2,224 1,793 1,187 
 
The table reports analyses of the lead-lag relation between corporate scandals and regulation for 26 countries over various sub-periods from 1800 to 2015 (see 
table 3). The dependent variables are binary indicators marking the incidents of corporate scandals (SCANDAL) and the enactment of regulation 
(REGULATION) in a country and year. For the analyses, we combine all corporate scandals with all regulatory activities including supranational legislations in 
panel A (as indicated by the suffix _tot), and pure accounting scandals with accounting regulation in panel B (_acctg). We estimate model 2 in table 6, but only 
report the logit coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) z-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by country for the lagged moving averages of the 
two dependent variables. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
TABLE 9 
Analysis of Various Sub-Samples over the 1800 to 2015 Period 
 Developed Markets  Emerging Markets  Strong Rule of Law  Weak Rule of Law 
 (1) 
SCANDAL 
(2) 
REGUL.  
(1) 
SCANDAL 
(2) 
REGUL.  
(1) 
SCANDAL 
(2) 
REGUL.  
(1) 
SCANDAL 
(2) 
REGUL. 
Lagged Scandals and Regulation:            
 SCANDAL_tot[t–1 to t–3] 1.352*** 0.316*  2.521*** 0.717***  1.115*** 0.261  2.167*** 0.628*** 
 (5.67) (1.67)  (5.81) (4.11)  (4.11) (1.28)  (6.12) (2.77) 
 REGULATION_tot[t–1 to t–3] 0.531*** 0.985***  0.795*** 0.582  0.564*** 1.042***  0.560** 0.482 
 (2.77) (3.67)  (3.12) (1.24)  (2.83) (4.04)  (2.22) (1.24) 
Control Variables & Fixed Effects Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.257 0.106  0.270 0.147  0.252 0.087  0.275 0.168 
Observations 2,924 2,924  1,114 1,114  2,275 2,275  1,540 1,540 
 
 English  
Legal Tradition  
French  
Legal Tradition  
German  
Legal Tradition  
Scandinavian  
Legal Tradition 
 (1) 
SCANDAL 
(2) 
REGUL.  
(1) 
SCANDAL 
(2) 
REGUL.  
(1) 
SCANDAL 
(2) 
REGUL.  
(1) 
SCANDAL 
(2) 
REGUL. 
Lagged Scandals and Regulation:            
 SCANDAL_tot[t–1 to t–3] 1.640*** 0.559***  1.553*** 0.114  1.445** 0.859*  1.239*** 0.331*** 
 (2.95) (2.80)  (6.18) (0.43)  (2.44) (1.68)  (5.27) (3.04) 
 REGULATION_tot[t–1 to t–3] 0.570** 0.318  0.515* 0.754***  0.839*** 1.493***  0.707 0.264 
 (2.33) (0.75)  (1.91) (2.59)  (3.60) (5.40)  (0.72) (0.41) 
Control Variables & Fixed Effects Included Included  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.192 0.076  0.237 0.185  0.354 0.116  0.286 0.093 
Observations 1,114 1,114  1,403 1,403  854 854  444 444 
 
The table reports analyses of the lead-lag relation between corporate scandals and regulation for various sub-samples of the 26 countries over the 1800 to 2015 
period (see table 3). The dependent variables are binary indicators marking all incidents of corporate scandals (SCANDAL_tot), and the enactment of all 
regulatory activities (REGULATION_tot) in a country and year. We analyze the following sub-groups: (i) developed versus emerging markets based on the 
classification in the Morgan Stanley Capital International database as of 2000; (ii) countries with strong versus weak rule of law based on the index scores 
from La Porta et al. [1997] and split by the sample median; and (iii) a country’s legal tradition taken from La Porta et al. [1998]. We distinguish between 
English common law, French commercial code, German commercial code, and Scandinavian civil law countries. We estimate model 2 in table 6, but only 
report the logit coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) z-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by country for the lagged moving averages of the 
two dependent variables. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
  
TABLE 10 
Analysis of Individual Sample Countries 
Country  
(sorted by past 
REGULATION) 
SCANDAL_tott as Dependent Variable  Country  
(sorted by past 
SCANDAL) 
REGULATION_tott as Dependent Variable 
SCANDAL_tot[t–1 to t–3] REGULATION_tot[t–1 to t–3]  
SCANDAL_tot[t–1 to t–3] REGULATION_tot[t–1 to t–3] 
Coefficient z-statistic Coefficient z-statistic 
 
Coefficient z-statistic Coefficient z-statistic 
Spain 3.001*** (4.34) 3.591***1) (3.40)  Israel 3.152** (2.20) -0.721
1) (-0.80) 
Israel 0.000 (0.00) 3.569** (2.46)  Greece 3.096**
1) (2.52) 1.365 (1.41) 
Denmark 2.670*** (2.91) 3.283***1) (2.85)  Korea (South) 2.813*** (3.03) 0.645 (0.54) 
Korea (South) 6.955*** (4.33) 2.793 (1.22)  India 2.430** (2.46) -2.540 (-1.51) 
Austria 2.222*** (2.78) 2.495** (2.23)  Italy 2.354*** (3.36) 1.425* (1.83) 
Sweden 3.115***1) (5.31) 2.150** (2.29)  Switzerland 2.166***
1) (3.28) 0.762 (0.73) 
Greece 2.394** (2.01) 2.143** (2.03)  Austria 2.152** (2.47) 1.350 (1.14) 
Italy 3.358*** (4.97) 2.088*** (2.79)  Brazil 1.888** (2.40) 1.589* (1.86) 
France 2.307***1) (4.78) 1.959***1) (3.27)  Finland 1.728* (1.77) 1.524 (1.62) 
Poland 3.382***1) (4.13) 1.867 (1.44)  Sweden 1.607*** (2.71) -0.169 (-0.16) 
Brazil 3.088*** (3.69) 1.819* (1.93)  Spain 1.558** (2.37) 0.613 (0.74) 
Australia 0.891 (1.48) 1.774** (2.41)  United Kingdom 1.347***
1) (2.87) 0.516 (0.81) 
China 2.799***1) (4.22) 1.595** (1.98)  Belgium 1.265 (1.61) 1.849*** (2.68) 
South Africa 3.477***1) (5.66) 1.512*1) (1.90)  France 1.206** (2.29) 1.851*** (2.99) 
Portugal 1.694***1) (2.62) 1.256** (2.06)  Denmark 1.201 (1.56) 1.255 (1.16) 
Netherlands 3.007***1) (4.79) 1.233* (1.78)  United States 0.905 (1.59) 0.577 (0.88) 
Belgium 0.274 (0.38) 1.217* (1.93)  Portugal 0.877 (1.08) 3.612*** (5.05) 
United States 2.257***1) (4.13) 1.049 (1.33)  Germany 0.846* (1.65) 1.455**
1) (2.01) 
Germany 3.525***1) (6.13) 0.871 (1.07)  China 0.839 (1.42) 1.619** (2.29) 
Switzerland 3.287***1) (5.24) 0.661 (0.63)  Australia 0.822 (1.16) 1.806** (2.03) 
Egypt 0.818 (1.16) 0.582 (0.82)  South Africa 0.797 (1.49) 2.009***
1) (2.90) 
United Kingdom 2.588***1) (5.67) 0.502 (0.86)  Netherlands 0.651 (1.04) 2.081*** (2.97) 
India 2.006*** (2.64) 0.453 (0.38)  Poland 0.488 (0.68) 0.417 (0.41) 
Japan 1.451*** (2.64) 0.256 (0.45)  Egypt -0.133 (-0.17) 2.143***
1) (3.22) 
Canada 0.703 (1.12) 0.223 (0.31)  Canada -0.221 (-0.29) 0.057 (0.07) 
Finland 2.318** (2.15) -0.023 (-0.02)  Japan -0.455 (-0.79) 1.486**1) (2.44) 
 
The table reports analyses of the lead-lag relation between corporate scandals and regulation for the 26 individual sample countries over the 1800 to 2015 
period (see table 3). The dependent variables are binary indicators marking all incidents of corporate scandals (SCANDAL_tot), and the enactment of all 
regulatory activities (REGULATION_tot) in a country and year. We include an intercept in the regressions, but only report the logit coefficient estimates and 
(in parentheses) z-statistics based on robust standard errors for the lagged moving averages of the two dependent variables. We report countries rank ordered 
by the magnitude of the lagged REGULATION or SCANDAL coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
(two-tailed). The superscript 1) marks coefficients that remain significant at the 10% level or better after including GDP per Capita and Inflation as control 
variables in the regressions.   
TABLE 11 
Spillover Effects from Other Countries (United Kingdom and France) 
 Spillover from the United Kingdom  Spillover from France 
 (1) 
SCANDAL_tott 
(2) 
REGULATION_tott 
 (3) 
SCANDAL_tott 
(4) 
REGULATION_tott 
Lagged Domestic Scandals and Regulation:      
 SCANDAL_tot[t–1 to t–3] 1.574*** 0.334**  1.649*** 0.359** 
 (5.78) (2.42)  (6.12) (2.26) 
 REGULATION_tot[t–1 to t–3] 0.564*** 0.928***  0.548*** 0.851*** 
 (3.39) (3.78)  (3.50) (3.49) 
Lagged Foreign Scandals and Regulation:      
 Foreign_SCANDAL_tot[t–1 to t–3] 0.353** 0.192  0.288** 0.215* 
 (2.53) (1.33)  (2.19) (1.71) 
 Foreign_REGULATION_tot[t–1 to t–3] 0.528** 0.289**  0.033 0.512*** 
 (2.57) (2.02)  (0.27) (3.57) 
Control Variables:      
 ln(GDP per Capitat–1) 0.703*** 0.565***  0.714*** 0.489*** 
 (7.56) (4.48)  (7.35) (3.56) 
 ln(Inflationt–1) -0.042 0.341***  -0.025 0.318*** 
 (-0.20) (3.73)  (-0.12) (4.08) 
Fixed Effects C C  C C 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.260 0.123  0.249 0.115 
Observations 3,730 3,730  3,657 3,657 
 
The table reports analyses of cross-country spillover effects for the lead-lag relation between corporate scandals and regulation for 26 countries over the 1800 
to 2015 period (see table 3). The dependent variables are binary indicators marking all incidents of corporate scandals (SCANDAL_tot), and the enactment of 
all regulatory activities (REGULATION_tot) in a country and year. We estimate model 2 in table 6, but add the lagged three-year backward-looking moving 
averages of corporate scandals and regulation from another sample country to the model (as indicated by the prefix Foreign_) and exclude the respective 
country from the analysis. We test for spillover effects from the United Kingdom and France. The table reports logit coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) 
z-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by country. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
